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CHAPTER I 
SLAVERY BELIEFS OF BRITAIN AND AMERICA 
1 
Before Texas was admitted to the Union in 18̂ .6 as the twenty-
eighth state, manifold controversies over its admission had taken place. 
These controversies were not merely sectional, nor did tĥ  simply in­
volve the United States and Mexico. They also reached across the seas 
and brought Great Britain into sharp discord with the United States. 
While there were many issues at stake in the conflict between Great 
Britain and the United States over Texas, one of the most important 
issues was that of slavery. During the years of the independence of 
the Republic of Texas, an ideological struggle took place between these 
two nations, in many instances centering around the slavery question. 
This struggle brought into play the diplomatic forces of both nations 
in an attempt to shape the future destiny of Texas. What interests 
were at stake for Great Britain and the United States? I-̂ iat part did 
the slavery question play in the diplomacy concerning Texas? How was 
the diplomatic struggle waged? Did Great Britain intervene in the 
domestic affairs of the parties concerned? What was the nature of the 
intervention? 
The respective attitudes of Great Britain and the United States 
toward slavery, prior to the revolution of Texas and its annexation to 
the United States, help explain the conflict that these two nations 
faced during the years I836-I8I4.5. The attitude of Great Britain toward 
slaveiy grew out of her involvement in the traffic of slaves from 
Africa to her colonies in the new world. This trade became very suc­
cessful under the Royal African Company, chartered by Charles II, 
which carried on a growing trade for a half centuiy. Because of the 
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large profits gained, the English merchants sought to secure a virtual 
monopoly of the trade. Because the British navy had control of the 
seas, a large part of the slave trade was assured. The signing, of the 
Asiento with Spain in 1713 gave Britain and her merchants the consent 
of Spain to supply the Spanish colonies with slaves for the next thirty 
years.̂  The agreement itself failed, but the trade was carried on by 
any British merchant who desired to do so by paying a small duty. This 
form of slave trade lasted until the first decade of the nineteenth 
century. 
The British, therefore, must be held responsible for transport­
ing most of the Negroes brought to the Americas in pre-revolutionary 
times. Wiile it is impossible to know the exact number of slaves trans­
ported, scholars have estimated the number to be between 140,000 to 
100,000 each year until the American Revolution, at which time the 
2 trade came to a near standstill. 
This traffic in human beings was not without its opponents in 
England during the eighteenth century. The Anglican Church and its 
missionaries became increasingly aware of the evils inherent in the 
trade and were asking for reform on religious grounds. Other religious 
and humanitarian groups began to demand restrictions or reforms for 
various reasons. As the latter part of the century drew to a close, 
these attacks on the slave trade came with greater frequency. The 
proponents, in turn, rose to the defense of the trade and cited its 
¥̂. E. DuBois, The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to 
the United States of America (New York, 19011). p. 3. 
E. DuBois, Slave Trade, p. 5. 
h  
advantages to the British econony. The leaders of the defense were 
mainly the merchants and planters connected with the British West 
Indies where the economy was based on slave labor. 
The political drive for the abolition of the slave trade gathered 
momentum as the nineteenth century opened. A national conscience had 
been awakened in Britain and it would not be satisfied until the trade 
was ended. The abolition of the slave trade by Denmark in l802 and 
the short-lived abolition by France in 179b no doubt sparked the move­
ment in Englando The issue of slavery progressively overshadowed all 
other British colonial questions in the first third of the nineteenth 
century,-̂  
The man who probably did the most to abolish the slave trade in 
Britain was William WLlberforce, a member of Parliament. Wilberforce 
belonged to a group called the "Clapham Sect", which derived its name 
from the community of Clapham. The group was composed of evangelical 
churchmen, and they provided the driving leadership in the anti-slavery 
movement.̂  
In 1807 the abolitionists registered a political and moral vic­
tory when Parliament passed a law abolishing the slave trade. To enforce 
the law, it was made a criminal offense in I8II. Wilberforce and the 
other leaders of the anti-slavery movement were to be disappointed, how­
ever, as thqy saw other nations continue the trade. Tĥ had hoped that 
the law of I807 would not only end the slave trade, but would eventually 
Âlfred L. Burt, The Evolution of the British Empire and Common­
wealth from the American Revolution ("Boston, 1956), p. 197. 
Â. L» Burt, The British Empire, p. 188. 
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lead to emancipation. This could not become a reality as long as other 
nations persisted in carrying on the trade. The British Parliament, 
however powerful, could not legislate for the world, but it could—and 
did—incorporate the abolition of the slave trade as a part of its 
foreign policy and elevated it to a position of international import­
ance. The Tory government began a series of treaties with other powers 
to block the trade. At the Congress of Vienna in iBlIi the British 
statesmen were untiring in their efforts to secure the abolition of 
the slave trade.̂  
The British rightly felt that there would be new impetus of the 
trade following the Napoleonic War. Public feeling was running high 
in Britain and there was a demand that the government use their strong 
international position to secure universal abolition. During the early 
summer of I81I4 there were 772 petitions bearing almost a million sig­
natures addressed to the House of Commons, encouraging the government 
to take a strong stand on this matter.̂  The next decade saw a concerted 
effort on the part of the government, not only to gain international 
approval of abolition, but also international enforcement by the right 
of search and visit, which would enable British warships to board and 
search ships belonging to other nations. However, this turned out to 
be an impossible goal, for maqy nations, fearing an ulterior motive on 
the part of the British, would not consent. The slave trade continued 
to bring African Negroes to American shores. Her foremost opponent in 
these matters was her former colony and twice-tested foe, the United 
E. DuBois, Slave Trade, p. 13)4. 
Â. L. Burt, The British Empire, p. 198, 
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States. 
Britain assumed the leadership of an international crusade 
against the institution of slavery» In January of 1823, the Anti-
Slavery Society was organized in London. M.lberforce, again the cham­
pion, was now joined by Thomas Buxton, the parliamentary leader in the 
cause of abolition. The first plan advanced by Buxton was one of 
gradual emancipation, but as this process became long and drawn out 
it was changed to one of immediate freedom for the slaves. There were 
bitter fights between the contestants. There were threats of revolu­
tion in the West Indies and talk of their joining the United States.? 
Actually, the defendants of slavery were fighting a losing cause, 
particularly after Grey came to power in 1832. In 1833, one year 
after the passing of the Reform Bill, the abolition of slaveiy in the 
British possessions became a reality. The planters were to receive 
compensation for the loss of their slaves, and a system of apprentice­
ship was set up to soften their loss of labor and property,̂  Britain 
would again be defied in her quest for abolition on a world-wide scale, 
and once again her foremost opponent would be the United States, espec­
ially the Southern states. 
The majority of the slaves transported to the Western hemisphere 
were taken to the Southern colonies where the climate and the mode of 
agriculture were suited to slavery. The slaves made possible the rise 
of the plantation system on which the economy of the South was based. 
Â. L. Burt, The British Empire, p. 205. 
®The apprenticeship system was a complete failure and was aban­
doned in 1838, 
7 
This system which grew in the southern part of the eastern seaboard 
was also carried westward by its advocates until it had spread into the 
southern part of the Mississippi Valley. 
Despite the general acceptance of both slave-trade and slavery, 
there were some dissenting voices among the colonists. M)st opposition 
came from the Quakers who protested on religious principles» During 
the period leading to the American Revolution, the strong emphasis 
placed on personal liberties influenced the abolition-minded. Immedi­
ately following the Revolution, ten of the thirteen original states 
prohibited the slave trade, and seven had abolished or were to abolish 
9 
slavery. 
The first important federal action on the question of slavery 
came during the Constitutional Convention in 1787. By the time the 
Convention ended the delegates approved an article that restricted the 
Federal Government from passing any law against the slave trade until 
l808. The article came under fire by some Southern conferees, but at 
this time their defense of slavery was weak, and the article was passed. 
This article led to the passage of a law prohibiting the slave trade 
when the time limit was near. President Jefferson, in a message to 
Congress on December 2, 1806, recommended that action be taken on such 
a law. The next day Senator Bradley of Vermont introduced a bill in 
the Senate which became the Act of Barch 2, l807. This act, which made 
slave trade illegal for American merchants, said nothing about the in­
stitution of slaveiy itself. 
Ŵilliam L. Kàthieson, British Slavery and its Abolition, 
1823-1838 (London, 1926), p. 107. 
lOw. E. DuBois, Slave Trade, p. 95 
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Though the South voiced opposition to this measure, it did noth­
ing to reverse the trend of the times. In fact, between 1790 and l820_, 
the apathetic attitude of the slave holders was in marked contrast to 
11 
their aggressive defense of slavery in later decades. After 1820, 
however, the attitude of the South decidedly changed to their "posi­
tive good theory." This can be attributed to the fact that through 
inventions like the cotton gin and the power loom, cotton was now a 
very profitable venture. The large plantation slave gystem had now 
gained a secure position and the South had become the chief producer 
of raw cotton. The arguments in the defense of slavery now increased 
in number and fervor. Every imaginable defense was raised, including 
the theory that American slavery was a fulfillment of the Old Testament 
prophetic curse on Canaan (Genesis IX: 20-27). 
Armed with these arguments, the South approved of the continu­
ation of the slave trade even though it was now against federal law. 
The law was openly broken by American ships that carried on the trade. 
The Federal Government attempted to suppress the trade, but its apathy 
was very evident in the lax enforcement of the slave trade act. The 
administration could not be completely blamed for this laxity since 
very little money had been appropriated by Congress to provide for the 
necessary, men and ships that effective enforcement would take. The 
British proposal (involving the right of search and visit) to help in 
the suppression of the trade was also turned down. Any slave trade 
ship, regardless of nationality, was then completely protected from 
^̂ %.lliam S. Jenkins, Pro-Slavery Thought in the Old South 
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 193^), p. ijFI 
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outside powers by sailing under the American flag. 
A strong sectional controversy now emerged between the North 
and South as to the evils of the institution of slavery» The North 
was split in its attitudes on the subject due to economic reasons» 
Many of the Northerners confessed that slavery was evil, but believed 
that if the South benefitted economically, the whole country would 
benefit. It was also well known that many of the ships involved in 
the illegal importation of slaves belonged to New England merchants. 
The majority of the Northern populace, however, was against slavery 
and agitated for its reform or termination. The South, on the other 
hand, was well united in its defense of the institution that they con­
sidered the backbone of their econony. It was their firm belief that 
without slavery, and an adequate supply of slaves, their whole way of 
1 P 
life would be destroyed. 
A concomitant conflict was also being waged at this time between 
the Federal and State Goverments in the matter of states' rights» The 
South maintained that the Federal Government had no right to interfere 
in a matter that was, according to a strict interpretation of the Con­
stitution, a matter for the states to decide. It was now alleged that 
any legislation on slavery was, therefore, a right reserved for the 
states. This fight was very apparent in the controversy waged over 
1 Kenneth Stamp's Peculiar Instition gives a good account of 
the pros and cons of the evils of slavery» He also advances the 
theory that the slave holders were themselves enslaved by the insti­
tution* Because of this, and the rising cost of slavery, the insti­
tution was slowly dying out. 
10 
the admission of Missouri to the Union» 
During the second quarter of the nineteenth century the United 
States presented a very complex picture to the rest of the world. On 
the one hand^ the Federal Government had outlawed the slave trade, but 
on the other hand, it appeared to condone it through its lack of en-
forcement» The North was far from united in its stand on the issue 
and was unable to make much headway towards abolishing slavery or the 
slave trade. The South, in contrast, seemed firmly entrenched in its 
beliefs and wanted the world to know it. 
The attitudes of Great Britain and the United States on slavery, 
consequently, appeared in sharp contrast prior to the conflict over 
the annexation of Texas. Great Britain, through its abolition of the 
slave trade (I807) and then slavery (1833) had become the self-appointed 
but recognized international leader for universal emancipation. There 
is no doubt that she desired to rid the world of slavery. Ample proof 
of this were her actions to ask, bribe, or coerce nations to give up 
the slave trade. Her leading statesmen readily admitted this desire 
for the complete abolition of slavery. "Great Britain," Aberdeen, the 
British Foreign Secretary, stated, "desires, and is constantly exerting 
herself to procure the general abolition of slavery through the world» 
^̂ Mssouri wished to enter the union as a slave state, but was 
prevented from doing so until Maine was admitted as a free state. In 
addition to this, slavery would be forbidden in the rest of the Louisi­
ana Purchase territory north of 36°30'. The Mssouri Compromise was 
then followed by the ¥ebster-Hayne debates in 183O in which the South 
maintained that the states had final authority over all matters that 
directly affected them or their citizens. 
^̂ Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States 
(BewTork, 19L7), p. 228. 
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The United States, in contrast, seemed to stand as the principal 
defender in the cause of slavery» She would not enforce her slave 
trade law, nor would she permit the British navy to assist her in its 
enforcement» American ships now appeared to be the greatest carriers 
of the slave trade, and many of the slaves were being transported to 
the southern part of the United States where slavery was held in high­
est esteem. 
Great Britain and the United States, because of their opposite 
viewpoints on slavery, would soon be in conflict over Texas, the re­
bellious province of Kexico» Many questions were raised in the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century. Why did the conflict occur? Was 
the issue important enough to cause men to contemplate war? If so, 
were the interests of each nation enough to justify such thinking? To 
some, there was no question about the magnitude of the conflict. "The 
Texas question," to quote one author, "linked with that of Oregon in 
the Democratic platform of I8LL, had far wider ramificationso It as­
sumed, in fact, the dignity of a world problem, for it involved not 
merely the United States, Texas and Mexico, but Great Britain and 
France as well. The efforts of these two great European powers to 
prevent the annexation of Texas to the United States constitutes one 
of the most interesting and important chapters in the international 
politics of that day,̂  ̂
l̂ John Holladay Latane and David Wainhouse, A History of Amer-
ican Foreign Policy 1776»19iiO (New York, I9I1I), pp. 
CHAPTER II 
THE STRDQGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND RECOGNITION 
12 
In 1821 Texas was largely an unsettled part of the Mexican 
nation. At that time, this territory which lay on the southwest bor­
der of the United States was inhabited by a few Catholic missionaries 
and Spanish landlords. It was only natural that settlers from the 
United States, moving West as they had been doing for many years, would 
eventually come to the borders of Texas and seek admission» îfeny of 
these settlers were Americans in search of more land. In 1822 Steven 
Austin secured permission from the Mexican government to carry out a 
plan which permitted American settlers to enter Texas» Austin was 
granted a large amount of land in Texas for the express purpose of 
settling this land with American immigrants» At this time the Mexican 
government was very much in favor of settling this unpopulated province 
to the north; it meant that the land would be developed and additional 
revenue would be gained. 
The Mexicans, however, set up certain conditions that these 
settlers would have to abide by upon settling in the province of Texas. 
They were obliged to swear allegiance to the Mexican government. New 
immigrants were expected to become members of the Catholic Church. 
The settlers were willing to do this, since it seemed to be a small 
price to pay for the lands they would receive. Though these condi­
tions would loom larger in a few years, the lure of cheap land brought 
a rush of settlers from the southern United States, làny were small 
farmers, but some were the large plantation owners from the Southern 
states whose lands had been exhausted in the production of cotton. 
As the years went by, the Mexican authorities rightly anticipated 
13 
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that their free land policy in Texas was a mixed blessing. They began 
to seriously wonder if they could hold on to their province of Texas. 
Because of their own unstable government, which had been plagued by 
political upheavals since its inception, they had been neglecting 
Texas throughout the years. The Texans, in fact, had been governing 
themselves more and more; this engendered a spirit of independence. 
The Mexicans could easily see other problems which would become factors 
in their sovereignty over the Texas province. The Texans retained 
their ties with the United States rather than assuming new ones with 
their adopted country. Since they were Americans, they would continue 
to live in the wqy in which they had been accustomed. They could not 
forget the freedoms they enjoyed under the Constitution of the United 
Stateso Therefore, the Texans continued to identify themselves with 
their mother-country. They sent their children to schools in the 
United States rather than in Mexico. They carried on their trade with 
the United Statesj shipping goods to the United States was easier and 
more profitable than to Mexico City, eight hundred miles away. They 
continued to buy their supplies from New Orleans rather than from Mex­
ican merchants. Their religious differences led them to openly defy 
the Mexican law which allowed only the Roman Catholic Church, the state 
church of Mexico, to exist in Texas. 
It was only a matter of time before the Mexican government would 
pass restrictive measures against the province of Texas. In the late 
1820's and early l830's, it adopted a "get-tough policy" and passed 
many laws designed to preserve their jurisdiction over the Texans. One 
law proclaimed that no more settlers from the United States could come 
into Texas, Another prohibited bringing slaves to Texas. This was a 
15 
blow to the Texan cotton planters who depended on their slave labor. 
Another law demanded a tax on all goods coming into Texas seaports» 
Texans felt that this was intended to discourage them from buying in 
the United States. Furthermore, after Mexican soldiers were stationed 
in Texas and forts were erected at important points, many American 
settlers felt that they were being spied upon. They feared they would 
soon lose all the rights they had under the Mexican government. 
As these laws became known in Texas, rumblings started for a 
movement of independence from Mexico. Steven Austin took it upon him­
self to go to Mexico City and iron out the differences between the 
government and the province of Texas, He was imprisoned in Mexico 
City by the dictatorial president, Santa Anna, and by the time he got 
back to Texas the movement for independence was well on its way. 
Texas proclaimed her independence on March 2, I836. The subse­
quent struggle did not last long. Santa Anna went north with his army 
to crush the revolt, and after two successes at the Battle of the Alamo 
and Golliad, he was defeated at the Battle of San Jacinto on April 21, 
18360 His amy was completely routed, and Santa Anna himself was taken 
prisoner. Only after signing a document that gave Texas her independ­
ence was the defeated dictator released. ïfexico did not intend to 
live up to this document, and she would never formally recognize the 
independence of Texas. 
At the time of the revolt in I836, the Anglo-American population 
east of the Nueces River was approximately thirty thousand, plus some 
five thousand Negro slaves. This was a small population for a nation 
Ŝ. F. Bemis, Diplomatic History, p. 218. 
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that would now have to fight an even greater fight than that of the 
revolution from Mexico. The Texans realized that in order to become 
a full-fledged nation, they must be recognized by other world powers. 
This recognition would give them not only the prestige of a full-
fledged nation, but would also enable them to seek the financial help 
thqy desperately needed after the revolution from Mexico. 
The nation from whom they first sought recognition was the 
United States. The Texans were soon to be disappointed, however, for 
they found that the land of their birth was in no hurry to grant them 
the recognition that they so desired. It would be almost a year from 
the date the Texans declared their independence until the United States 
formally recognized them as a nation. The Texans themselves believed 
that the United States would rapidly grant them the recognition which 
thqy desired since their population was composed largely of former 
Americans. The Eexican authorities also thought that the United States 
would grant Texas recognition. 
The government of the United States, under the administration 
of President Andrew Jackson, did not want to risk offending KSsxico by 
recognizing Texas before it was sure that the Texans could retain the 
independence that they had so recently gained. The Mexicans had made 
it known that recognition, or annexation which they feared more, would 
be a cause for war against the United States. In truth, the government 
of the United States had suffered a minor embarrassment over the Texan 
fight for independence. When the revolution had started, mat̂  Ameri­
cans, primarily from the Southern and Western states, had volunteered 
to fight for Texas and ventured to Texas for the express purpose of 
helping that province gain her independence, a situation which Mexico 
17 
City dis approved of. To the latter it appeared that the United States 
conspired to take Texas from them. Therefore, instant recognition on 
the part of the United States would make it appear that the Mexicans 
were right in their suspicionso 
American abolitionists also argued against the recognition of 
Texas. They knew only too well that there were slaves in Texas, and 
that the Texans would want to keep these slaves, for they were very 
much a part of their economy. They were positive that if the country 
of Texas would ever become a state it would enter the Union as a slave 
state. They could be sure of this, since the Texan constitution for­
bade the emancipation of slaves. In fact, the importation of addi­
tional slaves was legal in Texas, Free Negroes were not allowed to 
2 reside in Texas without the approval of the Texan Congress. 
The abolitionists of the North, then, found themselves in agree­
ment with the Mexican government's contention that there was a great 
plot in the United States behind the revolution. They believed that 
the slave holders had conspired to settle Texas, revolt, annex it to 
the United States, and make it another slave state. In the opinion of 
many abolitionists, Andrew Jackson himself was at the head of this 
ŝlaveocracy" plot. His agent in Texas was supposedly Sam Houston. 
While it is doubtful that Andrew Jackson was party to such a scheme, 
rumors to that effect spread. Perhaps this was why Andrew Jackson 
felt that he should not push for the recognition of Texas. Such action 
3 
on his part would only lay foundation to the rumor, 
%ay A. Billington, Westward Expansion (New York, 1 9 k 9 ) ,  p. 1̂ 98, 
^8. F. Bemis, Diplomatic History, p. 22^., 
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The Northern states of the United States were also against the 
recognition of Texas, not on the purely humanitarian grounds of slav­
ery, but because politically they feared that they would lose the 
lead they now held in the Congress of the United States. At this time 
the North had a majority in Congress; as long as they held this major-
ity, they could control the reins of United States legislation. The 
North, along with the abolitionists, realized that if Texas were ever 
to become a part of the United States, the huge territory covered by 
Texas could easily be divided into several states, all of which would 
become future slave states. With these four or five prospective states, 
the Northern sectionalists would loose the majority they now enjoyed. 
But recognition could not be put off indefinitely because there 
were parties in the United States that favored this recognition. The 
slave states of the South, for the express purpose of gaining Texas as 
a slave state, exerted a great deal of pressure for the admission of 
Texas to the Union. There were also pressures from many Northerners 
who had relatives or friends in Texas and felt a strong kinship toward 
Texas for this reason. Because of this they wanted to at least recog-
nize, not necessarily annex, Texas. 
Other factors also explain how the Texas Republic finally gained 
the recognition of the United States. It was rumored that in order to 
satisfy British business men who held Mexican bonds, Mexico was getting 
ready to sell Texas to England. This, of course, would not be tolerated 
by the South, and even the North would not want argr such interference 
by an outside power. In order to verify this rumor, Stevenson, the 
American minister to England, sounded out Palmerston on the matter. The 
latter said that Mexico had applied indirectly for mediation, but that 
19 
England would not interfere» His government also approved the neutral 
attitude of the United States. Thus, even though this rumor seemed to 
be without fact, it still had its effect on the American public and 
the administration,̂  
President Jackson, in the center of the controversy, was deluged 
hy reasons for and against the recognition of Texas. Individuals, as 
well as national groups, made their feelings known. The Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court in Tennessee, for example, wrote to President 
Jackson, stating that if the war between Mexico and Texas continued, 
many American volunteers would go to Texas to fight and would probably 
move right into Mexico itself. Then Mexico might appeal to England, 
who, pursuing somewhat the same policy as in India, might gain control 
of Mexico, the Gulf, and the mouth of the Mssissippi. This, he felt, 
was a reason for recognizing Texas immediately.̂  
At first, in spite of these pressures, Jackson did not want to 
recognize Texan independence. But when on March 1, 1837, the Senate 
resolved that Texas should be recognized, he was in favor of it. Fears 
of British interference had convinced Jackson that if the Texans were 
put off much longer, they might turn to some other foreign nation. 
Perhaps it would be England, perhaps it would not, but England would 
have to be regarded as the principal eneny as far as Texas was con­
cerned. Jackson felt that Texas might have to yield its exclusive 
Ŝamuel Flagg Bemis (ed.). The American Secretaries of State 
and Their Diplomacy (New York, 192b), 17, 32JSV 
-"Catron to Jackson, June 8, I836, Libraiy of Congress, Jackson 
Papers, noted in Justin H. Smith, The Annexation of Texas (New York, 
19m), pp. 
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commercial conoeBsions to Great Britain, primarily in the field of 
cotton, and Texas might become so entangled in her foreign relations 
that she would not be suitable for annexation at a later date.̂  The 
recognition was complete when a charge d'affaires was sent to Texas on 
March 7, 1837. 
The Texans had now made their first move in being recognized as 
a nation of the world. Tĥ  did not stop here, however, for most Texans 
still hoped that their nation would be annexed to the United States. 
In fact, the Texan representative in Washington soon set about a plan 
for this annexation when he moved that Texas be annexed in August, 1837. 
This proposal was turned down. 
The arguments against annexation of Texas to the United States 
were similar to those against the recognition of Texas. Kany people 
feared that annexation would provoke a war with Mexico. The Northern 
states were still against any type of annexation that would increase 
the strength of the South. The abolitionists, of course, still kept 
up the cry that Texas was a slave state and, therefore, could not be 
admitted to the Union, The leader of the abolitionist movement against 
the annexation of Texas was John Quincy Adams, who had previously 
voiced his disapproval of the recognition of Texas. The American Anti-
Slavery Society, realizing that the question of annexation would prob­
ably be raised by Texas, went ahead in June, I837, and circulated 
petitions against annexation, inviting signatures, mostly throughout 
the North. On September 20, 1837, Adams presented to the House of 
Representatives twelve petitions and remonstrations against the admission 
Ŝ. F„ Bemis, Diplomatic History, p. 22$. 
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of Texas into the Union, and on January 1^, 1838, nearly fifty addi-
7 tional petitions were presented on this same matter. Small wonder 
that the Secretary of State John Forsyth refused any action on annex-
ation at this time. 
The Texans, now that they had received recognition by the United 
States, set about to gain recognition from other world powers. The 
European power that they most desired recognition from at this time 
was Great Britain. To achieve this recognition. General Pickney Hen­
derson was sent to Great Britain in June, I837. On October 13, 1837, 
he approached Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretaiy, and asked him 
to put the recognition of Texas before Parliament. Though doubtful of 
passage, Palmerston put the question before Parliament, where it failed 
to pass. Henderson stated the probable reasons for the failure of 
Parliament to recognize Texas at this time. In the first place, the 
political situation in Great Britain was precarious for the Melbourne 
administration. Then, too, English creditors had advanced Mexico a 
great deal of money since the time that Mexico gained her independence 
from Spain, It was thoû t it would be very undesirable at that time 
to wipe out any friendly relations with Mexico. To them it was more 
important to favor Mexico than Texas. But the most significant reason 
for the lack of recognition was the existence of slavery in Texas. 
Henderson also felt that Palmerston considered it unnecessary to recog­
nize the independence of Texas since the Texans were probably soon to 
voluntarily surrender their independence. No doubt he referred to the 
7Allan Nevins (ed.). The Diaiy of John Quincy Adams 179L-l8L$ 
(New York, 192Ï), pp. b&L, L93. 
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probable annexation to the United States. Furthermore he felt at that 
time that by recognizing Texas he would remove an obstacle to the an­
nexation of Texas to the United Statesj this annexation he did not 
desire.® 
After the failure of his mission to receive recognition in Great 
Britain, Henderson embarked to France. There, in 1839, he secured her 
recognition of Texas, so that his mission was not a complete failure. 
After the failure to gain the recognition of Great Britain in 
1838, the Texan government seemed to put it aside during the year 1839. 
However, in Mexico, the British Minister Richard Pakenham was used by 
Texas to mediate with Mexico for recognition of Texas. In spite of 
Pakenham's efforts, Mexico refused to cooperate. Mexico, due to na­
tional pride, would not listen to any plan submitted by the Texan 
emissaries who used Pakenham as a go-between. Pakenham showed that 
he was in favor of Mexican recognition of Texas even though his own 
government was against it. He saw that due to the unstable government 
in Mexico, which was at this time having trouble staying in power, 
Mexico would never have any chance of reconquering the Texas Republic. 
All in all, it seemed that in the years I836-I839 Great Britain was 
without any large interest in Texas. Her primary concern seemed to be 
with Mexico. 
The next effort of the Texans to secure recognition of their 
nation by Great Britain came in December, 1839. At this time James 
Hamilton was chosen for the task. His job in Great Britain was to try 
Ĵ. I. Worley, "The Diplomatic Relations of England and the 
Republic of Texas," Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association, 
(Ju%y, 19031, p. k. 
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and secure both treaties of recognition and commercial treaties. His 
mission̂  like Henderson's, was two-fold. If he failed in Great Britain 
he would go on to other powers like Belgium and France to secure fin­
ancial help there» Hamilton made his mission known to Palmerston and 
then proceeded on to the continent where he attempted to gain commer­
cial backing for Texas. 
On October Ih, Hamilton wrote to Palmerston that he was author­
ized to sign a treaty of commerce and navigation if Great Britain would 
recognize Texan independence. In this letter he put forth many argu­
ments as to why Great Britain should recognize Texas. He stressed the 
commercial value that Texas could be to Great Britain as a cotton pro­
ducer. Great Britain's recognition might also induce Mexico to recog­
nize the independence of Texas, and a peace favorable to all would be 
established» Hamilton also advanced some consequences if Great Britain 
failed to recognize Texas. Duties on Texan imports and exports would 
go up, and Texas would have to look elsewhere for help, perhaps indi­
cating the United States.^ 
On October 18, Palmerston wrote to Hamilton that Great Britain 
was willing to negotiate their treaty if Texas would at the same time 
sign a slave trade treaty giving Great Britain the right of search. 
He stated that this treaty would have to go along with the other 
treaties required for British recognition of Texas. On November 13, 
the first treaty of commerce and navigation was signed. On November 
lli, Palmerston and Hamilton signed the treaty allowing mediation by 
Êphraim Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas 
(Baltimore, 1910), pp. 32-53. 
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Great Britain between Mexico and Texas wherein Texas promised to pay-
one million pounds sterling of the Mexican foreign debt. This would 
principally go to the English bondholders of Mexican bonds in payment 
for their loss- The third treaty, signed on November l6, dealt with 
the suppression of the African slave trade. This provided for a mutual 
right of search. These treaties were to be ratified within six months, 
and upon ratification, the British would recognize the independence 
of the Texas Republic. 
Great Britain was now willing to recognize Texas because she 
was sure that Mexico could not regain Texas. The main reason, however, 
was perhaps found in the third treaty, providing for suppression of 
the African slave trade. Although the anti-slavery feeling in Great 
Britain had not been running too high since 183$, it had a rebirth in 
I8L0. Because of the anti-slavery feeling. Palmerston felt that he 
could not offer to grant recognition to Texas unless some concession 
was made in the matter of slavery.It was also thought that signing 
such a treaty would help to get the United States to sign a similar 
slave treaty. This had been a goal of British abolitionists for many 
years. 
Great Britain's recognition of Texas now seemed assured. How­
ever, a new issue arose that held up recognition even longer. Hamilton 
had not been authorized by Texas to grant any concessions as far as 
the slave trade treaty was concerned. Because of this, he sought a 
device by which he could get around it. The two treaties concerning 
Adams, British Interests, p. 59. 
Lo Worley, "Diplomatic Relations," pp. 12-13. 
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commerce and mediation were sent to Texas for ratification by one 
messenger» The one on slave trade was sent by another. The two 
treaties (commerce and mediation) were received in Texas and ratified 
almost immediately. However, the slave trade treaty did not reach 
Texas until after the Texas Congress had adjourned for that year, 
Hamilton later claimed that his messenger had gotten sick in New York 
12 and therefore was late in reaching Texas. This, then, held up the 
ratification of all three treaties. Without the ratification of all 
the treaties, Texas independence would not be recognized by Great 
Britain. 
A great deal of time lapsed before such recognition would take 
place. During this time lapse, there was a change of government in 
Great Britain. On August 30, 18^1, the Melbourne ministry fell, and 
the Peel government came to power. Palmerston was replaced by Lord 
Aberdeen. The leaders of the Peel ministry let things stand as far 
as Texas was concerned. They let it be known that they would honor 
the treaties that were signed by the ftfelbourne ministiy, in spite of 
strong opposition by some members of Parliament. Their objection was 
that Texas was a slave nation. They feared if free colored people 
were not permitted to live there, British colored subjects would be 
13 
endangered if they entered. 
It was not until January 22, 18^2, that the Texan Congress fin­
ally approved the slave trade treaty. %th recognition depending on 
it, the Texans probably felt that they had no choice at this time. 
Adams, British Interests, p. 68. 
^%ansard's Parliamentary Debates, LVI (l81|l), 3^6. 
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Hamilton, however, was discredited and told to come home. On June 28, 
I8I4.2, the treaties became effective and Great Britain finally recog­
nized the independence of the Texas Republic» Captain Charles Elliot 
was sent to Texas as the charge d'affaires. 
Texas had now been formally recognized by both the United States 
and Great Britain. Thus far, in spite of strong differences in opinion, 
a diplomatic conflict between these two nations had not yet erupted. 
The question of Texan annexation to the United States was to bring 
these differences in the matter into sharper focus. Great Britain 
definitely did not want to see Texas become a part of the United States, 
whereas the United States, though somewhat split on the issue, would 
seek, and eventually gain, the goal of annexation. 
CHAfTER III 
BRITISH REASONS FOR KEEPING TEZAS INDEPENDENT 
27 
A student of American history might be surprised to find that 
the British took so imich interest in the annexation of Texas. He might 
wonder to himself why the British concerned themselves with this pro­
vince of Mexico that had revolted in I836. After all, Texas was a land 
far from the British Isles with no British subjects and few economic 
interests. îfeny a Briton must have asked, "Where is Texas? To whom 
does it belong? What value is it?", just as today many Americans did 
not know the whereabouts and significance of South Viet Nam until the 
fight against communism there was brought to their attention. Just as 
Americans may wonder what interests the United States has in South Viet 
Nam, so the general public in Great Britain probably wondered what 
interests they had in Texas in the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century. 
In 1836 Great Britain was the leading world power. The title 
"The British Empire" suggested the strength enjoyed by the British. 
Great Britain had colonies in every hemisphere; a British flag stood 
on every continent; the Union Jack was evident on every ocean and major 
sea. Because of this might. Great Britain could not isolate herself 
from world problems, even those in the remote corners of the globe. 
She was either directly or indirectly involved, and often had to take 
sides in most disputes. Most world powers in history have faced simi­
lar responsibilities. 
Because she had become a great trading nation, Britain was 
interested in most of the world's markets. During the Napoleonic Wars, 
Spain had fallen to France in I8O8, resulting in the revolt of the 
28 
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Spanish colonies in the New World. England was quick to take advantage 
of the trade possibilities offered by these new Latin American coun-
tries. To add to her stature. Great Britain had become the financial 
center of the world; she was quick to lend customers the money needed 
for commercial growth, which, in turn, increased her trading potential­
ities, Through this financial help, these countries soon found them­
selves dependent upon the British. Britain usually enjoyed a great 
deal of influence in these countries, and she was assured that the bulk 
of trade offered by them would be handled by British merchants. 
Great Britain, a world power, was definitely involved in Latin 
America. But what did the individual Briton feel? In what way was he 
personally involved or interested? The British people naturally took 
different views about the revolt of Texas. These views resulted from 
a variety of factors such as occupations, religion, politics, economics, 
etc. The general public of Great Britain probably expressed very little 
interest at the time of the revolt. After all, what would a revolt in 
far-away Mexico have to do with them? The business men who were the 
bondholders of Mexican debt, however, felt a great financial interest 
in the revolt. The abolitionists of Great Britain, such as the Clap-
ham Sect, undoubtedly wondered what effect this revolt would have upon 
slavery and the slave trade in Mexico and Texas. As time elapsed and 
trade with Mexico began to fall off, primarily due to the expense of 
trying to regain Texas, the groups involved in the trade between Mexico 
and Great Britain became increasingly concerned. The one factor the 
^All trade with foreign countries previous to this time had been 
restricted by Spain's colonial policy. 
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majority of the people had in common was a sense of national pride, 
When it became evident that Texas might be annexed by the United States 
they wondered what effect this would have on Great Britain's status as 
a world power. The British reasons against annexation were thus grouped 
into four major categories? financial interests in Mexico (English bond­
holders); fear of United States expansion (national pride); commercial 
interests (trade)j and slavery (humanitarian). 
Several of these categories were mentioned shortly after the 
Texas revolution when the attention of the House of Commons was called 
to the situation in Texas some of the friends of Mexico. On June 
1836, Mr, Barlow Hoy, a member of the House, brought up the question of 
slavery and slave trade in Texas. He asked if the government had any 
Intention of interfering to check these evils. Two months later, on 
August 5, he made a motion in the House instructing the government to 
take such measures as might be necessary to secure the fulfillment of 
existing treaties mth Mexico. His objective was to prevent slavery 
and the traffic in slaves in the province of Texas. In this speech he 
emphasized the essential interests of Great Britain in Mexico; first, 
the large amount of British money invested in Mexican trade| second, 
the danger of the annexation of Texas by the United States, in which 
case Great Britain must consider what commercial advantages the latter 
would gain over England; and third, the probability that slavery would 
be permanently established in Texas. He felt that Britain possessed 
the right to interfere in Texas, and asked that the British navy be 
2 commissioned to help recover the province of Texas for Mexico. No 
^E. Adams, British Interests, p. I6. 
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action was taken on the motion at that time as the situation in Texas 
was still not clear. It showed, however, that the British interests 
at that time were expressed veiy soon after the revolt of Texas oc-
curedL 
The British bondholders of the Mexican debt first felt the ef­
fects of the situation in Texas, These bondholders held close to fifty-
million dollars of the debt.^ They feared that if Texas were not re­
covered by Mexico, a large amount of their money would not be forth­
coming. It was only natural that they hoped for a speech Mexican 
reconquest of the Texas province. 
The fear expressed by Mr, Hoy concerning the advantages the 
United States would gain over Britain was a real one indeed. The 
British for many years had watched the United States grow in size, 
population and influence, Th^ feared that the international balance 
of power would be shifted to the United States. "The English people," 
wrote George Bancroft, minister to Great Britain from 18^6 to l8Ii9, 
"are already well aware of the rapid strides of America towards equal­
ity in commerce, manufacturing skill and wealth. Th^ therefore look 
with dread on the series of events which tend to enlarge the sphere 
of American industry and possessions."^ This dread of American expan­
sion led to a national jealousy of the United States on the part of 
the British. Because of the world power that Great Britain enjoyed 
in the nineteenth century, she looked with apprehension on any increase 
^Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union (New York, 
195&), p. 17. 
%arry Granbrook Allen, Great Britain and the United States—A 
History of Anglo-American Relations (17^3-1952) (New York, 1955), p."b05. 
32 
in power by another nation. 
The rapid territorial expansion of the United States gave a basis 
for the apprehensions felt by the British. The first great expansion, 
which doubled the size of the United States, occurred in I803 when she 
bought the Louisiana Purchase from France. Florida was added to the 
size of the United States in I819 when it was purchased from Spain. 
Spain felt at that time that she would rather sell Florida to the United 
States than lose her to the Americans by other means.^ The Louisiana 
Purchase was responsible in part for the Oregon question in which the 
British were greatly involved during the 1830*8 and UO's. This terri­
tory had been under dispute since l8l5 between the United States and 
Great Britain as to whom it rightfully belonged.^ Mlth the Texas revolt 
in 1836, it was feared that Texas would be the next step in American 
expansion to the West, feny felt that this expansion had to be stopped, 
and Texas was the place to stop it. 
Attempts to halt American expansion at that time were undoubtedly 
influenced somewhat by fear for the British colony of Canada. This 
fear had existed since l8l2, when American forces invaded that colony. 
If the United States were allowed to expand by annexing Texas, what 
would stop them from having further designs on Canada? In 1837 this 
fear was magnified when a small revolt took place in Canada and Ameri­
can volunteers went north to help the Canadians fight. The revolt, 
though brief and limited in scope, was greatly exaggerated; yet the 
^American claims were such that Spain would lose Florida by out­
right cession or war. 
^Spain and Russia gave up their claims to Oregon in I819 and 
182b, respectively. 
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fear of American designs was sure to remain in the minds of many British 
people. 
There was no doubt in British thinking that the United States 
had a great interest in Texas. Years before, the United States had 
made overtures to Mexico to buy that province from her. The Adams-Onis 
treaty on Florida in I819 had definitely set the boundary of the United 
States and Mexico» John Quincy Adams, who helped formulate the Adams-
Onis treaty between the United States and Spain, many times regretted 
that the boundaries had not been set to include a large part of the 
Texan province. While Adams was President of the United States (l825-
1829) he tried to rectify this by sending Joel R. Poinsett to Mexico 
with instructions to buy as much of Texas as possible. Mexico, however, 
did not want to sell Texas, and the proposal was rejected. When he 
became President in 1829, Andrew Jackson expressed interest in buying 
Texas. As his emissary to Mexico, he sent Anthony Butler who did no 
better than Poinsett. All efforts of the United States to purchase 
7 
Texas had failed. 
The British watched these attempts at expansion by the United 
States very closely, H, G, Ward, who regarded American expansion as a 
menace to British interests in the Caribbean, welcomed fears of this 
expansion. In 1823, on Ward's advice. Mer y Teran was sent to Texas 
on an inspection. He recommended that the growth of American influence 
be checked,® 
The British looked upon Mexico not only as a trading nation and 
^S. F. Bemis, Diplomatic History, pp. 219-220. 
%enry Bamford Parkes, A History of îfexico (Boston, 1938), p. 201. 
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an outlet for their goods, but also as a possible barrier against fur­
ther American expansion. In 1825, Canning supported this policy of 
treating Mexico as a buffer nation. This policy was carried on by 
succeeding foreign ministers« Palmerston, however, began to regard 
Texas, in lieu of Mexico, as the buffer against American designs to 
the West, especially after it became evident that Mexico could not 
0 
reconquer Texas. He believed that the balance of power should be a 
principle to regulate the affairs of the New World as it already did 
10 
those of the Old World. 
The British, after extending recognition to Texas, deemed it 
advantageous to help Texas grow and become a power that could counter­
act the influence of the United States. "British policy, therefore, 
so far as it concerned itself with Texas at all, sought to build up a 
strong republic--independent alike of Mexico and the United States." 
This would effectively stop any United States expansion further to the 
West. 
There were important commercial reasons whgr Great Britain would 
rather see Texas remain an independent nation. The British textile in­
dustry^ very dependent upon cotton, was at the mercy of the Southern 
statesJ the latter, one of the most important cotton producers in the 
world, set their own price on raw cotton. The Lancashire industries, 
consequently, had to pay a high price for the cotton upon which their 
Co Allen, Great Britain and the United States, p. I|.06, 
^%exter Perkins, Hands Off, A History of the Monroe Doctrine 
(Boston, _19lil) J p. 76c " 
l^G. L. Rives, "Mexican Diplomacy on the Eve of War With the 
United States," American Historical Review, Will (1913), 276«, . 
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business depended» As an independent cotton producing nation, Texas 
would be a serious competitor to the producers of that product in the 
United States. Another thorn in the side of the British business men 
was the high tariff that the United States imposed on all imported 
goodso They hoped an independent Texas would facilitate transporting 
their goods into the United States. If they could maintain Texas as 
a low tariff or free-trade market, little could stop British goods 
from coming into Texas ty way of Galveston, and then being smuggled 
into the United States over the long boundary that existed between 
those two countries. 
Taking the broader outlook, the merchants of Great Britain were 
worried about their entire Latin American market. If Texas were an­
nexed to the United States, the United States would have an even greater 
hold on the Gulf of Mexico. This would be a definite detriment to 
British commercial interests in not only the countries that were on the 
Gulf of Mexico, but in all of Latin America. In the event the United 
States were to gain this control, they would have the upper hand in the 
markets of the countries concerned. 
It was, nevertheless, the slavery question that attracted the 
most attention. We have seen how Great Britain had gone to great 
lengths to abolish slave trade, and wherever possible, slavery, through­
out the world. Little wonder, then, that one of the fears that Mr. Hoy 
expressed in the House of Commons in June, 1836, concerned slavery. 
Mexico had a slave trade treaty with Great Britain and had abolished 
slavery in her country in 1829. With the revolt of Texas, however, it 
was questionable whether these treaties would be honored by the new 
Republic of Texas. The British abolitionists feared that Texas would 
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conceivably become a new slave nation. Although nothing was done about 
Mr. Hoy's motion in the House, one of the conditions for Texan recog­
nition by Great Britain was the slave trade treaty that Hamilton and 
Palmerston had agreed upon. 
When the fear of annexation became prevalent in England, the 
abolitionists strengthened their arguments against Texas ever becoming 
part of the United States. They contended that annexation to the Uni­
ted States would involve the perpetuation of slavery and that slavery 
would eventually return to Mexico and someday spread into all of Latin 
America» The work that Great Britain had accomplished in abolishing 
the slave trade in many of the Latin American countries would have been 
in vain. It was of great importance, therefore, that the abolitionists 
encourage their country in supporting any movements that they might 
have against annexation« 
If a strong independent Texas and the balance of power principle 
would restrain the spread of slavery or stop it altogether, the aboli­
tionists would be satisfied and would support these goals. Great 
Britain had, by this time, accomplished one of these goals by the 
signing of the slave trade treaty. The next step was to induce Texas 
to abolish slavery altogether. Leading statesmen in Great Britain at 
this time were strongly against any type of slavery in Texas. "I can 
conceive,M wrote Buxton, "no calamity to Africa greater than that Texas 
12 
should be added to the number of slave trading states." Later, in 
August, I8I43, Lord Brougham spoke in Parliament about Texas being a 
dumping ground for surplus slaves and how abolishing slaveiy in Texas 
^^Thomas F, Buxton, The African Slave Trade (London, I839), p. 25. 
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might lead to the abolition of slavery in the southern United States. 
This seemed to be an impossible goal to attain. However, to the aboli­
tionists in England, even a slight hope in this direction would be well 
worth the effort to achieve it. Even though annexation might come 
later on, they hoped to stamp out slavery there and eventually in the 
rest of the South. 
The interests of the West Indian planters and business men coin­
cided with the abolitionists on the point of slavery. Because of the 
abolition of slavery by Great Britain, the British West Indies lost 
their slave labor in 1833» It remained to be seen if the free labor 
of the British West Indies would be able to compete with the slave 
labor in the southern United States and also in Texas. It was feared 
by these men that free labor would have little chance of competing. 
It would be in the interests of the business men and tradesmen, then, 
to seek the abolition of slavery in Texas and the United States, Ashbel 
Smith, the Texan representative to Great Britain, later reported that 
the commercial interests in Great Britain were willing to go to vir-
tually any lengths to abolish slavery in the Texas Republic. 
The courses of action by Great Britain were determined to a 
large extent by the predominant interests that her people felt in regard 
to Texas0 The arguments and fears expressed by the British people over 
Texas, whether they were those of a businessman, abolitionist, planter. 
l^S. F„ Bemis (ed.), American Secretaries of State, 17, 112„ 
L. Worley, "Diplomatic Relations," p. 19. 
l^Stanley Siegel, A Political History of the Texas Republic 
1836-18L5 (Austin, Texas, 1956), pp. 226-227. 
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or, for that matter, a common laborer were taken into consideration by 
the government. The amount of concern varied quite naturally accord­
ing to the interests of the various groups. However slight or intense, 
the important point was that many British people had an interest in an 
independent Texas. Their interests became manifest when the clash 
between their interests and those of the United States came face to 
face. What then, were the opposing interests of the United States? 
What was their side of the conflict when "... it assumed, in fact, 
the dignity of a world problem. 
H. Latane and D. ¥. Wainhouse, American Foreign Policy, p. 
235. 
CHAPTER 17 
AMERICAN REASONS FOR ANNEXING TEXAS 
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American interests in Texas were complicated when compared to 
those held by the British. While the British interests manifested a 
variety of viewpoints, all of them had one thing in common—a united 
front in opposition to the annexation of Texas to the United States. 
The Americans, on the other hand, presented a front that was torn by 
dissension. Their interests, like those of the British, varied accord­
ing to the occupation, econonçr, and political and religious beliefs 
held by the people. Unlike the British, however, the Americans did 
not have a common objective, but were split into two opposing camps: 
those in favor of annexation and those against. This split was caused 
primarily by sectional differences that pitted one part of the country 
against the other. The major antagonists in the struggle were the 
North and South; however, the West also made itself heard in the con­
troversial question. The struggle over slavery between the two main 
sections began early in the history of the United States. In I836 
the differences had grown in magnitude and were even more bitterly 
contested. To further complicate the issue, it must be realized that 
the Americans were much closer geographically to Texas than were the 
British, which resulted in closer personal interests. 
Because the American front was so diversified and unstable, it 
is impossible to group their interests as categorically as the British. 
For the purposes of analysis, the viewpoints of the Americans will be 
grouped into two major areas: First, those concerned with local or 




After hearing of the Texas Revolution, many Americans reacted as 
they did because of kinship and nationality ties. Margr had relatives 
and friends among the people of Texas, the toajority of them former 
Americans, and therefore, wanted very much to help them in their hour 
of danger and need. Some went so far as to shoulder their guns, cross 
the frontier, and join in the Texan fight for independence. Others 
stayed home and aided the fight by sending money and supplies. Later, 
many agitated for recognition and then annexation of the new republic, 
seeking a means to bring their relatives and friends back into the Union. 
Yet even Americans who lacked these ties of friendship and blood could 
identify themselves with these people. The Texans were still regarded 
as Americans with the same origins and beliefs. After all, had not the 
Texans proved themselves good Americans when they established a demo­
cratic government and a constitution similar to that of the United 
States? 
The political situation in I836 exemplified the sectional dif­
ferences that existed between North and South. One of the arguments 
against recognition was that if Texas were annexed, the North would 
lose her legislative majority in Congress. The North had every reason 
to believe this, when from the South ". . . boasts were made that North­
ern domination would come to end, were that extension of the national 
area secured." These boasts helped to make Northern politicians hos­
tile to Texan annexation. On the other hand, many Americans, including 
many Northerners, wanted annexation because they feared an independent 
Texas on their southwestern border. To the expansionist, such a 
^J. Smith, The Annexation of Texas, p. 67. 
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situation would block any further extension of American boundaries in 
this direction. These people believed that western lands belonged to 
those who acquired them from the Indians and developed them for the 
use of man. The expansionist believed this was enough reason for add-
2 
ing Texas, then California, and finally, Oregon. 
The business men of the United States were concerned for econo­
mic reasons. Many speculators had purchased certificates of Texan debt 
and also scrip worth Texan lands. Th^ saw that if annexation were 
realized, these certificates and scrip would increase in value. Busi­
ness men involved in trade with the new republic feared that an independ­
ent Texas, with her own commercial treaties with other nations, would 
endanger their trade. Their fears increased when the commercial North's 
trade with Texas decreased from $1,$00,000 in 1839 to $190,000 in 18̂ 3.̂  
The greatest apprehension evinced for annexation was that the 
South, unable to compete with a strong, independent, free-trade nation, 
would, as a matter of salvation, join with Texas. Such a possibility 
was less remote than it mi^t seem today because the South had closer 
cultural and economic ties with Texas than those she had with the indus­
trial North. Most of the immigrants to Texas had come from the South. 
Moreover, because of similar climate, they were involved in the same 
agricultural pursuits. The plantation system, which also prevailed in 
Texas, would probably eliminate any friction on the subject of slavery» 
Added to this, the South very likely saw this affiliation as a means 
A. Billington, The Far Western Frontier, p. 1^^. 
^Julius William Pratt, A History of Uj^ed States Foreign Policy 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1955), p. ??8. 
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to escape the high tariff imposed on them by the legislative majority 
of the North. 
A large number of Americans, consequently, believed Texas must 
be annexed to prevent the growth of a formidable and dangerous rival 
on the southwestern frontier. They feared that Texas "might seize all 
northern Mexico, drain the South of its slaves, outstrip the United 
States in the production of cotton, injure American commerce and manu­
facturers, and involve the United States in difficulties with foreign 
powers." 
The question of Texan annexation became a matter of international 
interest shortly after the Texas revolution when Andrew Jackson was 
urged to recognize Texas because of the "probable" British interference 
in the affairs of the new republic. There was no foundation for such a 
belief, but a rumor was circulated throughout the United States that 
Mexico was about to sell Texas to Great Britain to satisfy British bond­
holders of Mexican debt. Other foreign powers, such as France, also 
had to be considered, but of the potential rivals, the most dreaded was 
Great Britain.^ 
Why did the mention of "Great Britain" in connection with Texan 
annexation cause tempers to rise and indignation to boil in the United 
States? The comparatively short history of the United States served 
well to answer this question. Many senior citizens of the United States 
who had been born and bred before the Declaration of Independence pos­
sessed a deep-seated distrust toward and understandable fear of Great 
^Hariy J. Carmen and Harold C. Syrett, A History of the American 
People (New York, 19^2), I, 539» 
^R. A. Billington, The Far Western Frontier, p. Iii5. 
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Britain. The causes which led to the American Revolution and the war 
itself furnished a basis for the apprehensions felt by Americans » 
The War of l8l2, the invasion by the hated Redcoats, the burning of 
the Capitol and the inconclusive peace—all of these increased the 
hostility between the two nations. The jealousy of the two nations 
deepened as they sparred for the right of leadership and controlling 
influence in hemisphere affairs» The two powers were locked in contro­
versy over the Oregon boundary question; the disputed aid to Canada in 
the revolt of 1837 J the Maine and New Brunswick boundary dispute; and 
finally, British criticism of Americans who repudiated debts after the 
panic of I837. 
Our main area of interest, however, lies in the Anglo-American 
diplomacy concerned with Hispanic America. The major diplomatic action 
taken by the United States in this region was the proclamation of the 
Monroe Doctrine in 1823„ This was an attempt to stop European influ­
ence and interference in the new world. The British were interested in 
the countries of Latin America and had worked hard to build their trade 
and influence there. Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, was in 
accord with raach of the Monroe Doctrine, which he hoped would put a 
stop to armed intervention by other European powers in Latin America. 
Two other ideas were added, however, that he strenuously opposed. 
These were the prevention of future colonization in America by Euro­
pean powers and the view that America and Europe were separate worlds. 
These ideas Canning would accept . . neither in their commercial 
nor in their political implications, and during the remainder of his 
life (1823-1827) his vigorous effort to counteract them increased 
U5 
distrust of England in the United States»"^ 
During the years following the Monroe Doctrine the mutual suspi­
cion and rivalry of the United States and Great Britain over Latin 
America revealed itself many times. The struggle most apropos to the 
Texas question, and which probably showed the rivalry at its height, 
occurred in Mexico. Both nations had sent agents to Mexico to counter­
act the influence of the other. As an example of their activities, 
Joel R„ Poinsett, in addition to his attempt to buy Texas, was instruc­
ted to show the Mexicans the workings of a federal republican system. 
While in Mexico, Poinsett found that British influence was very strong 
and their influence was directed toward the establishment of an aristo­
cratic or monarchial government in Mexico. This was not surprising 
because Henry G. Ward, the British agent, as his instructions stated, 
was . . tactfully to encourage the establishment of a monarchy in 
case they found Mexican leaders favorably disposed." 
The rivalry in Mexico continued until the successful revolt of 
the Texans and the advent of the annexation question. The history of 
this rivalry and jealousy therefore explained the dread felt by Ameri­
cans when "Great Britain" was mentioned in connection with Texas as 
early as I836. Americans were afraid of British interference in Texas 
for many reasons, the most important reasons being defense, commerce 
and slavery. 
The United States had every reason to be wary of the British 
6j. Fred Rippy, Historical Evolution of Hispanic America (New 
York, I9U0), p, 36I1. 
7J. Fo Rippy, Hispanic America, p. 375» 
influence in Texas. After all, -with British Canada to the north and 
the undecided Oregon boundaries to the northwestj it appeared that the 
United States might well be circumvented by British lands. The appre-
hensiveness caused by the rumor that Mexico would sell Texas to Great 
Britain was confirmed by Henry ¥ise of Virginia. He inferred that 
annexation would be a means of checkmating British policy in North 
America. English newspapers, he noted, openly stated that Britain 
should make insolvent nations pay their debts with territory? Mexico 
with California and Texas, and Spain with Cuba. He feared that if 
Great Britain obtained Cuba and California, she would command the Gulf 
of Mexico, the Mississippi, and the Pacific trade.^ If such a design 
ever became a reality, the United States would be in a very vulnerable 
position if a war with Great Britain were to ever occur. Many Ameri­
cans remembered the War of l8l2 in such a light. 
To some, an independent Texas under British influence would be 
just as unfavorable. Jackson fully believed that if Texas were to 
remain independent she would be a province of Great Britain within six 
years and she would become involved in a war with the United States. 
He, like Wise, believed that annexation provided the means of check­
mating English policy. They were sure that Great Britain would at 
9 
least acquire an offensive and defensive treaty with Texas. 
Commercially, the United States had a great deal to lose with 
Texas under the control of Great Britain, whether it be complete or 
only partial control. The trade with not only Texas but all of Latin 
^S. Fo Bemis, John Quincy Adams, p. i;5l. 
A. Billington, Westward Expansion, p. $01. 
America would suffer as a consequence. This, of course, was exactly 
what Great Britain wanteds a strong, independent Texas that would act 
as a buffer, not only against American expansion, but also against 
trade. There could be little doubt that this scheme was realized by 
the Americans. 
By far the most important aspect of the commercial interests 
concerned the cotton trade. As previously shown, this was an import­
ant consideration of the British for stopping the annexation of Texas; 
conversely, it was equally important to the United States, particularly 
the South, to carry annexation through» The South's viewpoint was that 
Great Britain's desire for cotton would lead her to dominate Texas; 
after that, she would try to draw the Southern states into her economic 
—if not actually her political—web, A monopoly of the cotton trade 
was dear to both the Southerner and the Englishman. If Great Britain 
gained control of the commercial interests in Texas she could play one 
set of cotton producers against the other, which would result in lower 
prices for the commodity. Calhoun, champion of Southern rights, wrote 
to Secretary of State Upshur in August, 181|3, "If she can carry out 
her schemes in Texas and through them her designs against the Southern 
States, it would prove the profoundest and most successful stroke of 
policy she ever made; and," continued Calhoun, "would go far toward 
giving her exclusive control of the cotton trade, by far, of modern 
commerce» This she sees and is prepared to exert every nerve to accom­
plish ito"^^ The only salvation for the cotton producer then was to 
lOjohn Co Calhoun to Abel Upshur, August 27, 18^3, Department 
of State, Miscellaneous Letters, requoted from S. F. Bemis (éd.), 
The American Secretaries of State, 7, lli2. 
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seek annexation to prevent this possibility. 
Unquestionably slavery attracted the most attention in the United 
States over the question of annexation; because of its Inclusive char-
acter, it also became the most importunate. Slavery would be commingled 
with commercial, political, economic and defensive arguments brought 
forth in favor of annexation. Due to the close relationship of slavery 
to the production of cotton which all Southerners believed was essential 
to the South's livelihood, the South would raise the loudest cry for 
the annexation of Texas. The argument of slavery made its appearance 
early in the question of annexation. "There were powerful reasons why 
Texas should be a part of this Union," Calhoun stated. "The Southern 
States, owning a slave population, were deeply interested in prevent­
ing that country [Texas] from having the power to annoy them."^^ Cal­
houn said this in a speech delivered before the Senate on May l6, I836, 
when he advocated immediate recognition and annexation for Texas. In 
reply to arguments advanced by those who were against immediate recog­
nition, Calhoun connected the name of Great Britain with the issue. To 
him, annexation was a question of life and death. He firmly believed 
that Northern opposition to it stemmed from the fact that the North had 
not sufficiently weighed the consequences of British policy or consid­
ered the obligation of all sections to defend the South from the effects 
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of British greed„ 
The South and her leading statesmen knew only too well the 
S. Debates in Congress, 2^th Cong., 1st Sess,, 1835-1836, 
III, Part 2, 153T: 
l^George Lockhard Rives, The United States and Mexico, 1821-18̂ 8 
(New York, 1913), I, 603. 
position of Great Britain as the self-appointed champion of world aboli 
tion. The designs of the British, as a result, profoundly influenced 
American opinion, especially in the South. In I839, Prince Albert be­
came the president of a society devoted to abolishing slavery. That 
same year, a British author, James S. Buckingham, who visited America 
in 183% reported the American reaction caused by British anti-slavery 
beliefs and Prince Albert's new position. "I well remember," wrote 
Buckingham, "the deep impression which the news of that event created 
on the other side of the Atlantic. It was believed by many that the 
moral influence of England, thus represented and embodied, would do 
more to advance the cause of Emancipation in America than any agency 
13 
that had yet been put into operation." That the South needed further 
evidence than this that slavery in Texas was in danger was questionable 
The Southerners emphatically believed that Texas, if not annexed 
would succumb to British influence and that this, in turn, would lead 
to the abolition of slavery. Their fears were further confirmed in 
I8I42, when Britain demanded as a price of formal recognition of Texas, 
the ratification of the slave trade treaty with its right of visit and 
search. The Southerners feared that the next step might well be total 
abolition of slavery in Texas. If this occurred, th^ were sure that 
their whole way of life would be in jeopardy. A free state on their 
western frontier would mean they would face problems identical to those 
already presented by the North. A free Texas would provide an addi­
tional refuge for slaves and, many Southerners feared, a base from 
James Silk Buckingham to Prince Albert, recorded as introduc­
tion in James Silk Buckingham, The Slave States of America (London, 
I8J42), I, n.p. 
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which slave rebellions could be organized. The Mississippi legislature 
showed this concern for the South when it declared, "The annexation of 
Texas to this Republic is essential to the future safety and repose of 
the Southern States, 
Many Americans questioned Great Britain's humanitarian reasons 
as the sole purpose of their interference in Texas; they felt, rather, 
that Britain wanted a rival to the South's growing monopoly on cotton 
production. Cotton was as essential to Britain's economy as it was to 
the South—or even more— for Britain had more machines to keep running 
and more mouths to feed. "The general impression in the American press," 
after annexation had been refused in 1837, "was that Texas, in despair 
of ever entering the Union, was ready to deliver herself, bound hand 
and foot, to Great Britain; that Great Britain would insist on aboli­
tion; and that the real reason for British interest in the subject was 
that she hoped to raise up a great cotton-growing country which should 
1< 
prove a rival to the United States." In support of this theory, 
Americans knew the British West Indies, with no slave labor, could 
not compete with the slave-grown products of the United States» There­
fore, if Texas were to abolish slavery. Great Britain hoped she would 
be a natural competitor to the Southern states, resulting then in lower 
cotton prices for English manufacturers. This theme will be amplified 
in the following chapter. 
As a result of these national and international interests, many 
Iteo A. Billington, Western Frontier, p. II1.6. 
^^John Bach McMaster, A History of the People of the United 
States, From the Revolution to the Civil ¥ar (New York, 1996-1913), 711, 
Americans demanded the annexation of Texas» It has already been pointed 
out, however, that all Americans were not in favor of annexation and 
some bitterly fought the movement» The main opposition centered around 
John Quincy Adams and the anti-slavery societies of the North. Even 
though Adams had favored the purchase of Texas in 182^ during his admin­
istration, he was now tenaciously opposed to annexation; the primary 
reason for his opposition was slavery. He carried out this fight as a 
member of the House of Representatives, where in February, l8Ii3j he 
went so far as to put forward a resolution demanding, . . that any 
attempt by act of Congress or by treaty to annex the republic of Texas 
to this Union would be a violation of the constitution, null and void, 
and to which the free states of the Union, and their people ought not 
to submit.Because of his stand, Adams was subject to much abuse 
and was accused of being in league with British abolitionists. Never­
theless, Adams remained the leader of the opposition to the annexation 
of Texas as Calhoun remained the leader of the advocates. Both men 
would be prominent in the international conflict that would wage during 
the period 18L2-18L6. 
It can hardly be said, because of this complexity of interests, 
that the United States possessed a united front to put up against the 
solid front of Great Britain. How then did the United States stand a 
chance of gaining victory in such a conflict? Were the Interests of 
either nation so critical as to cause even the slightest conflict? To 
some, the interests may seem minor and greatly exaggerated, but to an 
Individual like Calhoun it presented a question of monumental importance. 
Nevins (ed.), The Diary of John Quincy Adams, p. ̂ 6. 
^2 
He emphasized this in a personal letter to his daughter» "I regard 
annexation to be a vital question," he wrote. "If lost now, it will 
be forever lost; and if that, the South will be lost. It is the all 
absorbing question. . . . It is, indeed, under circumstances, the most 
important question, both for the South and the Union, ever agitated 
since the adoption of the Constitution. 
^7John Co Calhoun to Mrs» Clemson, May 10, 18^^, requoted from 
Go Rives, United States and Mexico, p. 63O. 
CHAPTER 7 
THE CRUX OF THE CONFLICT 
53 
The year l8U2 witnessed the beginning of the conflict that was 
to erupt between the United States and Great Britain over the question 
of annexation» Both nations had recognized the new republic of Texas 
and were interested in her future. The United States, after recogniz­
ing Texas in March 1837, turned down a Texan bid for annexation in 
1838, fearing that annexation at that time was too unpopular with fac­
tions in the United States and, of course, Mexico, Because of the 
sensitivity of the issue, the Van Buren administration declined to 
offer any hope in this direction and the question of annexation was 
all but forgotten. Great Britain, meanwhile, held out hope in 1837 
and 1838 that Texas would be reconquered by Mexico, the nation England's 
interests were concerned with. Therefore, Great Britain refused to 
recognize Texas until she saw that Mexico had little chance of recover­
ing her lost province. Even then. Great Britain consented to recognize 
Texas only on certain conditions, one of which involved a slave trade 
treaty. This recognition was granted by England in June, l81i2o Texas 
was now recognized by all interested nations with the exception of 
Mexico, the former sovereign of Texas. 
Because Texas and Mexico were still at war, the condition of 
Texas at this time was serious Indeed. Houston, who became President 
of Texas again in December, I8LI, found his nation deeply in debt, 
virtually bankrupt, and with little credit. To make matters worse, 
Mexico had revived her efforts to reconquer Texas and it appeared she 
might be successful. These problems and their solution fell squarely 
on the shoulders of Houston. Would he solve them by seeking annexation 
SL 
once again or would he have to turn to a foreign power for help? 
John lyier, who became President of the United States following 
the death of Benjamin Harrison (April h, I8LI), wanted to revive the 
annexation issue. He was scarcely settled in the White House when 
Henry A. "Mise advised him to obtain Texas as quickly as possible. Tyler, 
quick to take the advice-, approached the Secretary of State Daniel Web-
1 
ster on the advisability of annexation. He knew, however, that due to 
the opposition and lack of public interest, he must have a good reason. 
He was soon to have help. In 18^2 public interest was revived when it 
appeared that Mexico might well reconquer Texas. It was rumored, more-
P 
over, that their invasion was to be financed by British funds. This 
seemed logical as a reconquered Texas would settle the question of 
slavery and the slave trade in Texas. The signing of the slave trade 
treaty between Texas and Great Britain in June may also have raised 
fears that Great Britain was forcing her ideas of slavery onto the new 
republic. Though there was very little proof to verify these fears of 
British intentions at the time, the situation did assist Tyler in his 
desire to revive the issue. 
After Great Britain recognized Texas, the Peel ministry sent 
Charles Elliot as their charge d'affaires to Texas. Upon arriving in 
Texas in August, l8L2, he immediately began to cultivate friends and 
gain influence with Texan officials. Elliott, an ardent abolitionist, 
firmly believed that slavery was a corroding evil and that it constituted 
Smith, The Annexation of Texas, p. IO3. 
p 
Two warships were being built in Great Britain for Mexico at 
this time. Funds for these ships were largely financed by the bond­
holders of Mexican debt and by British abolitionists. 
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the chief obstacle to a great and independent Texas. After a few short 
months in Texas, Elliot wrote to Addington, a personal friend of his 
in the British foreign office, outlining a plan to compensate the slave 
holders of Texas with British money in return for abolition and free 
trade. Elliot was sure that this plan would work, but felt that the 
time was inappropriate to send the plan to Aberdeen. He stated that it 
was his own plan, and that officially and publicly he would, of course, 
take the grounds that although England was against slavery, she had no 
desire to interfere with it in other countries. Elliot also stated, 
"I cannot help thinking that money lent to put an end to slavery in 
the South West direction in America and to give a place and position 
to the coloured races, would render as profitable returns as money 
spent in fortresses and military works on the Northern frontier of the 
United States."3 This, the first British official expression as far 
as abolition was concerned in Texas, also demonstrated the British 
fear of American expansion not only into Texas, but also in Canada. 
Presumably, Elliot had been inspired by Houston to advance this plan 
and he (Houston) was entirely in accord with it. 
In December, Elliot again wrote to Addington, stressing his plan 
more emphatically because he was concerned over annexation rumors that 
he had heard. His fears were based on the fact that Texas, weak and 
disorganized, had again turned to the United States. Early in l8L2, 
James Reily, Texan charge at Washington, was instructed to stucfy the 
%. 0. Texas, L, requoted from E. Adams, British Interests and 
Activities in Texas, p. lip. 
^E. Adams, British Interest and Activities in Texas, p. 113. 
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sentiment of Congress as to the probability of successful annexation 
negotiations. He reported that he found little evidence that the 
United States was ready to approach the subject. Houston, later that 
fall, sent Isaac Van Zandt to replace Reily» Van Zandt brought the 
subject before Tyler and found that the President and most of his 
cabinet were in favor of annexation, but that the idea was too imprac­
tical at that time to be assured of success. The impracticality was 
probably due to Congressional opposition. The government's attention 
was focused on the Webster-Asburton treaty at this time. In addition 
to this, relations between the United States and Mexico were not at 
their best and annexation could only make them worse. 
Texas left no stone unturned in her effort to better her condi­
tion in I8L2. It must be recalled that one of the recognition treaties 
signed between Texas and Great Britain called for an attempt by Great 
Britain to mediate a peace between Mexico and Texas. Aberdeen, who 
made this attempt, was convinced that it was hopeless at the time and 
informed the Texan charge to that effect. Texas then asked for a 
triple interposition by England, France, and the United States. This 
proposal, put forward to the two European powers in August, was acceded 
to by France but was turned down ty Great Britain. Great Britain had 
already tried to mediate, Aberdeen contended, and if they, with their 
strong influence in Mexico, could not bring it about, it would have 
even less chance with France and the United States. 
After Van Zandt's offer of annexation was turned down by the 
United States and the triple interposition turned down by Great Britain, 
g 
Supra, pp. 21-22. 
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Houston approached Elliot and again asked for British aid. He let it 
be known that he desired peace with Mexico and trusted to the good 
offices of Great Britain to help bring it about. This made Elliot 
enthusiastic and led him to write a letter to Percy Doyle, British 
charge to Mexico, urging him to approach the Mexican government about 
the possibility of peace plans. 
During 18^3 the question of slavery in the annexation issue came 
alive and caused a great deal of concern in all countries involved. 
The events gave Tyler and the advocates of slavery every cause to be­
lieve that Great Britain was interfering in Texas, especially in the 
abolition of slavery in that nation. Southerners did not really be­
come concerned over annexation until this time and then they became 
insistent only when th^ saw the defeat of annexation as a victory for 
the abolitionists and for Great Britain. Even then the South was not 
united on the issue, for some felt that annexation would be harmful to 
the old slave states, due to a migration of a great number of slave 
holders to the great lands of Texas.^ On the other hand. Great Bri­
tain saw an opportunity to establish the free and independent Texas 
that they desired. 
On January 23, 18^3, the annexation issue was revived when 
Thomas Gilmer, a Representative from Virginia, published a letter in 
the Madisonian stating that Texas must be annexed before the British 
abolished slavery there and before they acquired an overwhelming influ­
ence which would result in the termination of the Texans' present 
^Chauncey Boucher, "In Re That Aggressive Slavocracy," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, Till (l92l), 2L. 
^9 
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inclination to join the Union. This letter, seemingly totally unex-
pected, caused a great deal of comment in Washington. "This letter," 
•wrote Thomas Hart Benton, "was a clap of thunder in a clear sky. There 
was nothing in the political horizon to announce or portend it. Great 
Britain had given no symptom of any disposition to war upon us, or to 
excite insurrection among our slaves»"® Benton, of course, had no know­
ledge of Elliot's dream for emancipation in Texas. 
Another letter, written by Ashbel Smith, charge of Texas to Great 
Britain, caused even more alarm in the United States. On January 2$, 
he wrote a confidential letter to Van Zandt, stating his belief that 
people in Great Britain were seeking abolition of slavery in Texas and 
that Britain would guarantee Texan independence. This letter was made 
known to Tyler and his cabinet. "The establishment of a free state," 
he wrote, "on the territory of Texas is a darling wish of England for 
which scarcely any price would be regarded as too great. The bargain 
9 
once struck, what remecfy remains to the South?" Such a statement 
caused added concern and accelerated a move toward the annexation of 
Texas. Smith sincerely believed that Great Britain could have told 
Mexico at any time that Texas must be recognized, but refrained from 
doing so because they wanted Texas weary enough of the struggle with 
Mexico so that they would yield to the point of abolition in return for 
^Madisonian, January 23, 18^3, requoted from J, Smith, The 
Annexation of Texas, pp. 131-132. 
^Thomas Benton, Thirty Years View (New York, 18^6), II, 581. 
^Smith to Van Zandt, January 25, 18^3, requoted from G. Rives, 
The United States and Mexico, p. 56l. 
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British guarantees for their independence.^^ Smith undoubtedly be-
lieved that his letter to Van Zandt would arouse an increased desire 
for annexation in the United States to counteract the British designs» 
A new development occurred in February when the Robinson Plan 
11 
was made known, Santa Anna advanced this plan to Texas which would 
give Mexico a limited sovereignty over that republic. It would mean, 
too, that Mexico's law forbidding slavery would be in effect. Santa 
Anna made use of the British representatives in both Mexico and Texas 
to encourage Houston to accept the terms of the plan. Both Elliot and 
Doyle, eager to help, saw a chance of gaining abolition. Houston saw 
the plan more in the light of gaining an armistice which would be to 
the advantage of Texas. 
In Washington, meanwhile. Van Zandt did his best to arouse the 
jealousy of the United States so that added support would be gained 
for Texan annexation. In a letter to Anson Jones, the Texan Secretary 
of State, he stated that he had talked to President Tyler and informed 
him of the arguments put forth by Smith's letter of January 25= He 
also stated that he would continue to bring up the subject of annexa­
tion to Tyler and his cabinet whenever he had the opportunity to do 
12 
SOo 
The renewed interest in annexation did not go unnoticed by the 
opposition at this time. John Quincy Adams was active in his objections. 
lOj. Smith, The Annexation of Texas, p. 8L. 
The Robinson plan was named after a Texan prisoner of war. He 
advanced the plan to Santa Anna. 
l^Van Zandt to Jones, March 13, 18^3, Annual Report of the Ameri­
can Historical Association for the Year 1908, II, 135» 
and had, as mentioned in the previous chapter, brought resolutions 
against it in the House. The abolitionists in the United States now 
received unexpected help from an anti-slavery group at work in Texas. 
One of the leaders of this group, Stephen P. Andrews, a prominent 
lawyer and abolitionist, stressed emancipation by compensation to 
slave holders, with Great Britain furnishing the money for this com­
pensation. Where he got the idea for compensating the slave holders 
is not definitely known, but it was rumored that Andrews was a close 
associate of Houston and that Houston had passed on the plan he had 
received from Elliot. The latter had mentioned this plan, and there 
is little doubt that Houston not only knew of the plan, but also thought 
favorably of It. Some newspapers in Texas denounced the plan, but the 
tone of some seemed to imply that Houston favored it» The Civilian, 
an administration paper, also pointed out that British mediation had 
stopped the Montevidean War in South America on the condition that 
slavery be abolished and suggested that the war between Texas and 
13 
Mexico offered a similar field. 
The letters of Elliot, Smith and Gilmer, plus the Robinson Plan 
and the activities of Andrews all inferred that slavery would soon come 
to an end in Texas. The accumulation of these events raised a great 
deal of consternation in the United States, particularly when the name 
of Great Britain was mentioned in connection with each of them. The 
newspapers of both South and North, greatly aroused by these events, 
served to alarm the American people. The New York Journal of Commerce 
on May 19, I8U3, claimed that measures were under way to buy Negro 
B. McMaster, A History of the United States, p. 3l6. 
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emancipation and that the price amounted to five million dollar8--a 
gum, the editors believed, that would be sufficient to carry abolition. 
On June 2^, the Madisonian threatened: "If Great Britain, as her 
philantrophists and blustering presses intimate, entertains a design 
to possess Mexico Texas, or to interfere in any manner with the 
slaves of the Southern states, but a few weeks, we fancy, at any time, 
will suffice to raise the whole American People to arms like one vast 
nest of hornets. The great Western States, at the call of 'Captain 
Tyler' would pour their noble sons down the Mississippi Valley by 
lit 
millions." Many Americans, especially President Tyler and his cabinet, 
were sure of British interference in Texas, but there was still no con­
clusive proof that could be used against the British, proof that would 
completely arouse the sentiment of the people for annexation. 
The proof that the advocates of annexation needed became evident 
In June when the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society held its 
annual convention in London, The meeting became the focal point of 
the controversial slave question in the annexation of Texas. That 
event, coupled with the Robinson Flan soon to result in an armistice 
between Mexico and Texas, would bring the conflict to its zenith» The 
anti-slavery convention was attended by prominent abolitionists from 
both the United States and Texas. Andrews, the Texan abolitionist, 
was undoubtedly reponsible for various plans presented to the conven­
tion for effecting abolition in Texas. It was resolved to spare no 
efforts in order to achieve this goal. This was also mentioned as an 
^^Madisonian, June 2h, l8L3, requoted from J. Smith, The Annex-
atlon of Texas, pp. Ill and 11^. 
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"entering wedge" in the large task of eventually bringing about aboli­
tion in the United States.Andrews and Lewis Tappan made it known 
that they had visited John Quincy Adams before coming to England and 
that Adams, although he offered no advice, told them, "I believe the 
freedom of this country and of all mankind depends upon the direct, 
formal, open and avowed interference of Great Britain to accomplish 
the abolition of slavery in Teaas; but I distrust the sincerity of the 
16 
present British Administration in the anti-slavery cause." When such 
views from a leading American statesman were made known, one can see 
why the convention was inspired to make such resolutions on Texas. 
The most important event occurred when Andrews, who secured an 
audience with Aberdeen, suggested that the British guarantee a loan to 
emancipate the slaves of Texas in return for Texan lands, Aberdeen 
gave encouragement to the plan, saying that "Her Majesty's Government 
would employ all legitimate means to attain so great and desirable an 
17 
object as the abolition of slavery in Texas." This statement was 
reported to President Tyler and his cabinet by Mr. Duff Green who had 
been sent to England to sound out the British government on the ques­
tion of slavery. Needless to say, the statement caused a great deal of 
concern in both the United States and Texas. Smith, the Texan charge. 
Informed Aberdeen that Andrews was not authorized by the government of 
^^Harriet Smlther, "English Abolitionism and the Annexation of 
Texas," The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXXIII (July, 1928, to 
April, 1929), 19k. 
F, Bemls, John Quincy Adams, pp. 
^"^Smith, No. I4.I, July 2, I8L3, requoted from J, Smith, The 
Annexation of Texas, pp. 89-90. 
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Texas to negotiate a loan and that there was no disposition on the 
part of the people of Texas to see slavery abolished. He also asked 
Aberdeen to explain his (Aberdeen's) position. In a report to Anson 
Jones, the Texan Secretary of State, Smith said Aberdeen again admitted 
that it was desirable, but that, he added, "It is the well known policy 
and wish of the British Government to abolish slavery everywhere." 
However, Aberdeen also stated that there was no wish to interfere im­
properly on the subject and that they would give the Texan government 
no cause to complain. Nevertheless, he would not promise that the 
British government would not grant such a loan. The abolition of slav­
ery was so important, Aberdeen claimed, that a loan might be advised. 
Smith, however, was satisfied that Aberdeen was sincere when he stated 
that Britain would not interfere improperly as was Edward Everett, the 
American charge, when he also questioned Aberdeen on the matter. Tyler 
and Abel Upshur, who had replaced Webster as Secretary of State in May, 
were more inclined to believe the reports of Duff Green, since this 
suited their purposes in arousing sentiment in favor of annexation. 
The fact remained that Aberdeen stressed that Great Britain would like 
to see slavery abolished, not only in Texas, but "everywhere." 
During the same period of time, events took place in Texas that 
further alarmed the advocates of annexation in the United States. The 
Robinson Plan, thought by most Americans and Texans alike to be an 
impossibility, had resulted in an armistice when, on June 1^, Houston 
called fpr a cessation of hostilities. Santa Anna would comply with 
the plan on July 7» It was well known that the armistice was brought 
Ï^Smith to Jones, July 31, l8L3, requoted from Jesse Reeves, 
American Diplomacy Under Tyler and Polk (Baltimore, 1907), p. 126. 
6 ^  
about largely by the activities of British agents in Texas and Mexico» 
Elliot, in a letter to Doyle on June 21, said that he should urge Santa 
Anna to recognize Texas, which would be a formidable ally against the 
United States.Correspondence between the two chargés showed also 
that they contemplated great commercial advantages to Great Britain if 
abolition could be secured. Regardless of how involved these men were 
in the negotiations, it was enough to cause concern in the United States. 
A result of the negotiations was evident when Van Zandt was told, in a 
dispatch from Anson Jones dated July 6, to cease negotiations for the 
annexation because of the armistice under the Robinson Plan. Jones 
also stated that Van Zandt was to turn down any overtures until further 
20 
informed. In other words, it was now up to the United States to 
bring up any proposals concerned with the subject of annexation. Gil­
mer's letter in January proved to be prophetic, for he warned that 
through British interference, Texas would withdraw any desire for an­
nexation. To the pro-slavery elements, the evidence of British inter­
ference appeared to weigh in favor of annexation as each month of I8I1.3 
passed on. 
In July, Aberdeen decided to take a more direct approach to gain 
the abolition of slavery in Texas. He knew, of course, of the Robinson 
Plan and its demands, but apparently did not think it went far enough 
on the subject of abolition» "It may deserve consideration," he wrote 
to Doyle, "whether the abolition of slavery in Texas would not be a 
Adams, British .Interests, pp. 133, 13U. 
20Jones to Van Zandt, July 6, 18^3, Annual Report of the Ameri 
can Historical Association for the Year 1900, II, 195° 
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greater triumph, and more honourable to Mexico, than the retention of 
21 
any sovereignty merely nominal." Aberdeen considered that the plan 
probably held little chance of success if Mexico insisted upon retain­
ing its sovereignty over Texas. Later in the same month, Aberdeen 
again wrote to Doyle and stressed that Mexico should ask Texas to 
abolish slavery in return for Mexican recognition. "His Majesty's 
Government," he wrote in the second letter, "desires that you should 
press this point earnestly on the attention of the Mexican Govern­
or 
ment." This letter, if nothing else, illustrated the influence that 
the anti-slavery convention had on Aberdeen. A copy of the second 
letter was also sent to Elliot in Texas, which undoubtedly caused him 
to rejoice as it seemed to fulfill the dreams he had for abolition in 
Texas. Although officials in the United States did not know of these 
letters written by Aberdeen, they firmly believed this was Aberdeen's 
wish all along. Upshur, a strong annexationist who had replaced the 
pro-Northern Webster as Secretary of State, was fully convinced that 
Texas must be annexed to stop British designs. In order to do this he 
must convince Texas to open the door once again to annexation. He was 
frustrated in this respect, since Van Zandt no longer had the authority 
to negotiate on the subject. His concern was manifested in a letter 
written to W. S. Murphy, the American charge to Texas, in which he 
stressed the many disadvantages the United States would suffer in the 
event of Texan abolition. One of the worst would be the possibility of 
21?. 0. Mexico, l60, July 1, 181^3, requoted from E. Adams, 
British Interests, pp. 130-131» 
2%. 0. Mexico, July 31, l8h3, requoted from E. Adams, British 
Interests, pp. 137-139. 
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a war with Texas or the breakup of the Union. 
On August 18, Lord Brougham, who was one of the most conspicuous 
of the British abolitionists, added further cause for American anxiety 
when he interpellated the ministry in Parliament on the subject of 
British interests in Texas. He wanted to know what action was being 
taken and demanded that papers be presented. "The importance of Texas," 
he stated, "could not be underrated." If slavery were abolished in 
Texas, he contended, it would eventually lead to the abolition of slav­
ery in the South, He was certain that this goal could be reached if 
only the Mexican government would recognize the independence of Texas 
with abolition as one of the terras. Aberdeen, in sympatic with Lord 
Brougham's views, hinted very strongly that he was negotiating with 
Texas on the subject, but he declined to present the papers asked for.^^ 
Why did Aberdeen refuse to present the papers asked for? His actions 
on the question asked by Lord Brougham could have only led to the be­
lief that Great Britain was taking action on the abolition of slavery 
in Texas, 
Alarmed by these recent occurrences, especially the news of the 
Parliamentary debates of Lord Brougham and Aberdeen, Upshur contacted 
Van Zandt on October l6 and stressed the need to reopen negotiations on 
annexation. Els views were forwarded immediately to Texan officials by 
Van Zandt, According to Van Zandt, Upshur said that at no time was 
annexation more favorable. Van Zandt went on to state why he also 
thought that the time was favorable to negotiate a treaty of annexation. 
^"Abel Upshur to ¥m. S. Murphy, August 8, l8#3, Diplomatic 
Correspondence of the United States, XII, IiJ-US. 
^^Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, LXXI (l8L3), 961. 
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The South was unquestionably in favor, and the West would be in favor 
if Texas and Oregon were combined to satisfy the expansionist desires 
of that section. "The possibility of England's securing an undue in­
fluence in Texas, and thereby monopolizing her growing trade," he wrote 
about the North, "seems to have touched the secret springs of interest 
so fondly cherished by northern manufacturers, and presented the ques­
tion in a form hitherto unheeded." He therefore encouraged reopening 
negotiations, as he believed that if this offer were rejected, Texas 
25 
was not likely to have another opportunity so favorable. 
American advocates of annexation continued to stress the need of 
immediate action on the question. The news from Texas spurred them on, 
also, as it looked like the Robinson Plan, which th^ firmly believed 
involved abolition, would soon succeed. The Texan administration seemed 
to be very much under the influence of the British, as proved by the 
attacks made on Houston policy by the Texans themselves. The editor 
of the Brazos Planter suggested this when he accused the Republic of 
acquiring a "monarchial nurse. 
Houston did not accept Upshur's plan to begin negotiations for 
a new treaty of annexation. The reasons for his refusal were stated by 
Jones in a dispatch to Van Zandt on December 13. Houston freely ad­
mitted that by the mediations of foreign governments friendly to the 
interests of Texas, a peace with Mexico was about to be obtained. He 
also stated that if Texas agreed to annexation at that time, the foreign 
2^Van Zandt to Jones, October l6, l8L3, Annual Report of the 
American Historical Association for the Year 1906, II, 221. 
^^Brazos Planter, November 23, 18^3, requoted from S. Siegel, 
A Political History of the Texas Republic, p. 22U. 
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powers would withdraw their efforts of mediation, and Texas, should 
mediation fail, would be alone in their struggle. For various reasons, 
he felt such a failure was probable. Furthermore, he stated that the 
United States should attempt annexation by resolution and authorize 
Tyler to propose such a treaty. In that event, Texas would maybe act 
on it. 
The public clamor in the United States over Houston's action, 
particularly on slavery, also caused Aberdeen some anxiety. When in­
formed of the great amount of interest and concern he had aroused in 
the question of annexation, he thought it best to make an attempt to 
remove the cause. He saw that his actions on slavery did more to pro­
mote annexation than hinder it, which of course was not his intent. 
Consequently, in a letter dated December 26, addressed to Pakenham, now 
British charge in Washington, but subsequently delivered to Upshur, he 
disclaimed ary actions on the part of the British government to inter­
fere improperly or secretly in Texas, even though it was the wish of 
Great Britain to see slaveiy abolished in Texas as elsewhere. "Her 
objects," he also wrote, "are purely commercial, and she has no thought 
or intention of seeking to act directly or indirectly in a political 
sense, on the United States through Texas." 
In January, l&LL, Upshur continued his efforts to open the way 
for annexation. In order to overcome the objections of Houston, he 
now promised to give Texas military support while the treaty was 
27jones to Van Zandt, December 13, l8L3, Annual Report of the 
American Historical Association for the Year 1908, II, 232-233. 
28 
Earl of Aberdeen to Mr. Pakenham, December 26, 18^3, British 
Sessional Papers, #52, pp. 125-126. 
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negotiated. Van Zandt relayed this information to Texas and ag^in 
stated that he thought the treaty would end in success. Ch the basis 
of these assurances, Van Zandt was instructed to go ahead with treaty 
negotiations» The British now had cause to be concerned. It appeared 
that Aberdeen's letter of December 26, which had not been delivered at 
this time, was too late to head off any further annexation proceedings. 
The negotiations were interrupted on February 2.8, l8UI|, when 
Upshur was killed by a cannon explosion on board the warship Princeton. 
Tyler then searched for a suitable successor as Secretary of State and 
chose the man most in favor of annexation, John C. Calhoun. With the 
appointment of Calhoun, the success of the treaty was placed in jeopardy. 
The treaty was signed on April 12, and was then sent to the Senate on 
April 22. Along with the treaty went a letter written by Calhoun in 
reply to Aberdeen's letter of December 26. In this letter Calhoun man­
aged to place the entire annexation treaty as a means of defending 
slavery. He presented facts and figures purporting to show the ill 
effects of freedom upon the health, morals and general well-being of 
the Negro. The treaty, he also argued, would guard against British 
designs on slavery in Texas. 
When Pakenham received Calhoun's letter, he immediately wrote an 
answer, stating that Aberdeen's letter had been put in a light adverse 
to its meaning. "Great Britain has also formally disclaimed the desire 
to establish in Texas any dominant influence, and with respect to 
slavery," he reiterated, "she is not conscious of having acted in a 
29 
sense to cause just alarm to the United States." Calhoun, in answer 
Pakenham to Mr. Calhoun, April 19, l81|li, British Sessional 
Papers, #5%, p. 129. 
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to this letter^ claimed that the United States had acted within her 
10 
rights and that Great Britain should stay out of her internal affairs. 
Pakenhaui naturally sent these letters to Aberdeen so that he was made 
aware of the situation. 
Calhoun succeeded in placing the question solely on the grounds 
of British interference with the institution of slavery and presented it 
as the grand argument in favor of annexation. He undoubtedly thought 
that this would help the measure pass. It worked in reverse, however, 
and only strengthened the opposition to it in the North. Men like John 
Quincy Adams and Thomas H. Benton now increased their efforts to defeat 
the treaty. Calhoun's stand and the increased opposition of the North 
doomed the treaty to failure. On June 8 the treaty was defeated in the 
Senate by a vote of 3$ to l6. Slavery once again blocked annexation 
rather than precipitated it. 
Calhoun's letters, however, were coldly received by Aberdeen. 
That he felt indignation and anger at what he thought was an honest 
attempt to pacify the American public there could be no doubt. It must 
have appeared to him that, because of his stand on slavery, he had 
helped the cause of annexation rather than hindered it. He received 
news that Mexico had resumed hostilities after hearing about the annex­
ation treaty, and this, he feared, would also help hasten annexation. 
Worse yet, he had come under fire in Parliament over the activities of 
the Foreign Office. On May 20, Mr. Hume asked for papers to be presented, 
because it was his belief that the British government was attempting 
3%r. Calhoun to Mr. Pakenham, April 27, l8bL, British Sessional 
'apers, #$2, p. 130. 
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unjust interference in the internal affairs of other nations. ]Mr. 
Peel refused the papers in regard to the question. Aberdeen, therefore, 
was not only criticized by American statesmen, but now found himself 
under the critical eye of his own countrymen over the affair. He had 
accomplished the direct opposite of what he had wished, little wonder 
that he decided to change tactics, and informed Ashbel Smith that he 
. . more than once made observation to the effect that he regretted 
the agitation of the abolition of slavery in Texas . . . and that here-
32 
after he would have nothing to say or do in relation to the subject." 
The slavery issue, as far as British diplomacy was concerned, 
then came to an end. Because of the actions taken by the Americans, 
particularly Tyler and Calhoun, Aberdeen would renew his efforts to 
block annexation by other means. let, despite Aberdeen's desires, the 
slavery issue was too much in the center of the annexation proceedings 
to be simply put aside. Abolition remained the wish of many Engllsh-
men, and the question of slavery was to profoundly Influence American 
actions until the ultimate annexation of Texas. 
3'^Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, LXXIV (iSltU), 1330. 
^^Smith to Jones, June 2L, iSiiU, requoted from G. Rives, United 
States and Mexico, p. 68^. 
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Although he dropped slavery as an issue, Aberdeen was still de­
termined to block annexation. The means he next employed was a diplo­
matic act involving France, Mexico and Texas. The act, ignoring the 
subject of slavery, called for Mexico to recognize Texas on the condi­
tion that Texas would agree to maintain her Independent position and 
that Great Britain and France would guarantee the boundaries of Mexico» 
If Mexico would agree to this and France was willing, It would matter 
little to England what the attitude of the United States would be. It 
appeared that England, "... should it be necessary, would go to the 
last extremity in support of her opposition to the annexation."^ If 
Mexico did not go along with the plan it would not be put into execu­
tion. Aberdeen appeared willing to go to war with the United States, 
although he never seriously thought it would come about. No nation 
would risk a war with the combined powers of Great Britain and France. 
On Junê 3, iShh, Aberdeen wrote a long letter to Pakenham to 
once again allay the irritation of the American people on the subject 
of slavery. Great Britain would not interfere on slavery, he guaran­
teed, either through Mexico or by any other means. He went so far as 
to state that slavery was in America because of the slave trade that 
was carried on by British merchants years before. He did not, however, 
promise not to prevent annexation by another means, but wanted to give 
2 the impression that all opposition to annexation had ceased. 
%<, 0„ Mexico, 180, May 28 or 29, requoted from J. Smith, The 
Annexation of Texas, pp. 389-390. 
^F. 0. America, I4.O3, June 3> I8UU, requoted from E» Adams, 
British Interests, p. 173. 
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His proposal was received coldly by the Mexican government, for 
it was still their intention to reconquer Texas, even though they were 
warned by the British that reconquest would more than likely result in 
war with the United States, and in such a war, Great Britain could not 
possibly render any aid to Mexico. The proposal also suffered a set-
back when it was refused by Texas. After the United States Senate re­
jected the annexation treaty, there were cries (even though by a minority 
of Texans) to once again seek help from Great Britain. Houston, who had 
doubted that the treaty would pass, heeded these cries and was willing 
to accept the diplomatic act when it was offered. However, the political 
situation in Texas had changed by this time. A presidential election 
had resulted in the election of Anson Jones, the Texas Secretary of 
State. Even though he was not to take office until 18UU, he was not 
in favor of the diplomatic act and therefore refused to obey Houston's 
orders to accept it. He was confident that such an act would only lead 
to war and prevent annexation. "This 'Diplomatic Act' was a straw in 
a favorable wind," he stated, "but Texas need not clutch at straws. 
The price—becoming a sort of European protectorate—was too high for 
3 
Texas to pay for guaranteed independence." As a consequence, Great 
Britain did not receive a reply to the act. 
France offered little encouragement to Aberdeen's plan, even 
though the French first assented to the act. The French did not want 
to see Texas annexed, and were willing to protest against it; however, 
they were not willing to go to war to prevent it. King, the American 
^Herbert Gambrell, Anson Jones, The Last President of Texas 
^rden City, New York, 19LWj, p. 357. 
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chargé to France, added to this attitude of the French when he was in-
structed by Calhoun to urge France not to join in the act with Great 
Britain. Calhoun, in his instructions, reiterated the abolition hopes 
of G&'eat Britain and maintained this would be contrary to French inter­
ests as they would have to pay higher prices for Texan goods if the 
slaves were freed.^ With this argument, and the natural inclination 
of the French to distrust their long-time enemy Great Britain, the act 
was rejected. 
In the United States, news of the diplomatic act spread rapidly, 
and, as was expected, caused a rising tide of fresh indignation toward 
Great Britain. It appeared that any British interference, no matter 
how candid, caused American suspicions to work overtime and to wonder 
about the intentions of their rival. Every American was well aware 
this time that Great Britain wished to prevent the annexation of Texas 
and would go to the "last extremity" to do so. 
Why was Great Britain adverse to American annexation of Texas 
when so many Americans and, it seemed, the majority of Texans were in 
favor of it? What right did they have to even question American reasons 
for wanting Texas as a part of the Union? The New Orleans Picayune 
disputed the right of Great Britain when it asked a series of questions 
such as, "Does the United States or Texas attempt to Interrupt the 
British Government in her conquests? Have they remonstrated against 
the extension of her empire in India, the subjugation of Afghanistan, 
the seizure of the Sandwich Islands, » » <, the dismemberment of the 
Chinese possessions, or the lodgments she has made In every sea and 
bj. Reeves, American Diplomacy, p. 173. 
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upon every continent? What would England or the ciTilized world say 
if the United States were to protest against the annexation ̂ f Pondi-
chery to the British Crown* If both England and the colony desired it? 
Would not such interference be considered impertinent?" Perhaps the 
argument had then taken on the old explanation that it was the "prin­
ciple involved that counted." Whatever the argument, the diplomatic 
act succeeded in solidifying American opinion and resulted in additional 
cries for the annexation of Texas. 
Aberdeen felt sure that the United States would not go to war 
over Texas. His feelings, however, may have changed had he been aware 
of the new increase in Anglophobia caused by the act. There were 
Americans willing to go to war with Great Britain over Texas. Henry 
Wise of Virginia advocated war and expressed the opinion that he would 
like nothing better. This feeling was not confined only to the South, 
but was expressed by Northerners, also. Charles Ingersoll, a Democrat 
from Pennsylvania, supported Wise and the South. He brought out the 
controversies with Great Britain on the Northeast boundaryj the Oregon 
dispute and the right of visit and search. He also thought that war 
would not be too bad as it would rid the American people of two hundred 
million dollars of public debts. Ingersoll also felt that the United 
States would have the sympathies of France, Prussia, Russia, Sweden, 
Denmark and every maritime nation in the world.^ 
Aberdeen saw his act rejected by one country after another in 
^Tlcayune, December 27, iB^L, requoted from S. Siegel, History 
frmMiTMn 1 "til iwi III 11 m mi «ig—ai—gL» 
of Texas, p. 250. 
6s. F. Bemls, John Qulncy Adams, p. 
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the fall and winter of I8LL. What disturbed him more, however, was 
that he was not sure of the popularity of the act in his own country, 
especially when it carried the probable threat of war. There were 
several reasons why Great Britain could not afford a war with the 
United States. Ohe of these was the great amount of commerce carried 
on between the United States and Great Britain which would be lost in 
the event of war. Another, as the Picayune pointed out, the British 
government could not consistently rationalize open aggression in regard 
to the United States when they were openly carrying on the same policy 
in other parts of the world. Furthermore, Aberdeen undoubtedly remem-
bered Mr. Hume questioning his policy in May and would not like to have 
the episode repeated. As already mentioned, Aberdeen did not believe 
that war was a possibility and he felt himself safe in using threaten­
ing tones when he proposed the diplomatic act. He did not think that 
the United States dared to oppose the combined efforts of both Great 
Britain and France and would, as a result, let the annexation issue 
die. Upon learning of the reactions the act caused in the United States 
and observing the hesitancy of France to back the act, he became con­
cerned „ He realized that it would be an unpopular move on his part to 
have asked his own country's support of the act. "Englishmen," wrote 
one author, "in the forties were not only disinclined to fight their 
trans-Atlantic brothers, but would have dismissed the government that 
7 
asked it of them." Furthermore, Pakenham advised Aberdeen that the 
act should not be carried through as it might precipitate annexation 
rather than stop it; he recommended waiting until after the election 
^E. Adams, British Interests, p. 19L. 
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of before any further action was taken. Pakenham believed that 
the course of annexation hinged on who would be elected; and it was his 
hope that Clay would be the victor as he felt that annexation, under 
Clgy, would receive more calm consideration.^ Aberdeen finally decided 
to put the diplomatic act aside and wait until the election was over to 
see if ittKTe still necessary. 
The election of l8bL became an important factor in the question 
of annexation. The results were awaited eagerly by both America and 
Great Britain. It is disputed as to how much the question of Texan 
annexation had to do with the outcome of the election; but it would be 
described by many as one of the three American elections turning on a 
question of foreign affairs^ the other two being 1796 and 1920.^ The 
Whig Party nominated Henry Clay even though he had come out against 
the annexation of Texas; his reason was the threatened war with Mexico 
if Texas were annexed. Van Buren was the choice of most Democrats, but 
his nomination was turned down when he also declined annexation for the 
same reasons as Clay. Many believed Clay and Van Buren were less moti­
vated by the fear of a Mexican war than by the fear of reopening the 
10 
dangerous discussion of slavery. Because of the stand taken by Van 
Buren, he was politically unacceptable to the Democrats, and a candi-
date was sought who would be in favor of annexation. James K. Polk, a 
former governor of Tennessee, was selected as a compromise candidate 
because he did favor annexation, and he was consequently nominated for 
^E. Adams, British Interests, pp. 178-180. 
^Robert Ferrell, American Diplomacy (New York, 19L9), p. 97. 
Rives, The United States and Mexico, p. 627. 
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the presidency. Polk went on to win by a narrow margin and his election 
was hailed as a victory for Texan annexation» Tyler and his cabinet 
immediately construed the victory as an indication that the American 
people were wholeheartedly in favor of annexation. The following month 
Tyler proposed to Congress that Texas be annexed by joint resolution. 
In his address, while stressing that the United States had the right 
to annexation, he was careful not to base the need for annexation on 
11 
slavery as Calhoun had done. He probably felt that the feelings of 
mistrust and fear of English interference in other areas was enough to 
depend on without the slavery issue. To all intents and purposes, it 
looked as if the joint resolution would be successful. 
When Aberdeen learned the results of the American election in 
November, the time for decision had arrived. He was still not sure 
that France intended to back him in the diplomatic act. He did not 
have long to wait, however, as he was notified by the minister of Louis 
Philippe that France would refuse to recognize the annexation of Texas, 
but would not go to war with the United States in order to prevent 
12 
it. The diplomatic act, Aberdeen decided, was too risky for Great 
Britain to undertake alone and was, therefore, given up as a lost 
cause. This put Aberdeen in an awkward position, and forced him to 
blame its failure on Mexico, 
By the end of I8l4.i1, it appeared that Aberdeen was ready to capit­
ulate. He was sure that the United States would take further action 
towards annexation; he, of course, had not heard of Tyler's joint 
Reeves, American Diplomacy Under Tyler and Polk, p. 177» 
Smith, The Annexation of Texas, p. UOU» 
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resolution and still wanted to block annexation, but was confused as to 
what action to take. All of his efforts appeared to have been fruit­
less and he ended by regretting his actions. The policy he decided to 
follow next was a passive one. He still wanted to urge upon Mexico 
that it was to her best interests that she recognize Texas, but stressed 
that there would be no involvement or active campaign on the part of 
Great Britain to support her. 
This policy did not last long, as Aberdeen was informed in Jan­
uary, l81i5j that, because of a new revolution in Mexico, Santa Anna was 
prepared to recognize Texas. He was also informed that Texan officials, 
suffering from the defeat of the annexation treaty in the United States 
Senate, were still open to offers of British mediation in their behalf. 
The joint resolution had not been heard of in Texas as yet. 
As a result of this news, Aberdeen wrote new instructions to 
Elliot on January 23, in which he urged Elliot to again offer the med­
iation of Great Britain and France concerning Texan recognition by 
Mexico. He stressed again the need to avoid all unnecessary mention 
13 
of their government in the negotiations. Aberdeen approached France 
and was assured that France would help in the mediation, but gave no 
promises on guarantees or war. They would accept no responsibility 
other than mediation. France also consented to send the same instruc­
tions to their charge in Mexico, thus making it a joint endeavor. 
Meanwhile, the joint resolution, after much discussion and 
modification in Congress, was passed by the Senate on February 28 and 
0. Texas, 21, January 23, 18L5, requoted from E. Adams, 
British Interests, pp. 198-199. 
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was signed by Tyler March 1« The United States consented then, after 
almost nine years, to admit the Republic of Texas to its ranks. It 
remained now for the people of Texas to accept It. The news was for­
warded immediately to Texas, and by the twentieth of March, the Texans 
knew of the offer. 
Elliot received Aberdeen's letter of January 23 at about the 
same time in March, and with the French charge, decided to make one 
last effort to forestall annexation. They brought the news of the 
Mexican offer to Anson Jones, now President, and received from him the 
assurance that the Mexican treaty would be put before the Texan Congress 
if it could be received in time. With this assurance, Elliot decided 
to take the treaty to Mexico himself, and put it before the Mexican 
government. Because of Aberdeen's instructions to avoid involvement, 
Elliot made the trip to Mexico in secret. After waiting almost two 
weeks before the treaty was signed, Elliot return to Texas in time to 
place it before the Texan Congress at the same time the joint resolu­
tion was presented. On June l8, the joint resolution was adopted 
unanimously and a convention was called for July U, the purpose of 
which was to vote for annexation and to work out the methods of union 
with the United States. At the same time, the projected treaty with 
Mexico was rejected by the Texas Senate. The annexation controversy 
was all but over. Formal acceptance into the Union would not be con­
summated until February, 18^6, but it was a foregone conclusion that 
annexation had succeeded. 
The conflict over Texan annexation between the United States and 
Great Britain came to a close in the summer of iQU^o The event was 
hailed by both Americans and Texans as a great victory for a variety 
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of causes. To the supporters of slavery it was a victory over the 
abolitionists; to the expansionists it was a victory for manifest des-
tiqy; to the business men it was a victory for the American econoqy; 
to almost all Americans it was a grand diplomatic victory over the old 
and hated rival. Great Britain, who had done everything short of war 
to block the annexation of Texas. 
Great Britain has been accused of trying to block annexation, 
which she readily admitted, and of interferring in the internal affairs 
of the United States and Texas, which she explicitly denied. The 
crucial question then seems to be: Was Great Britain guilty of inter­
ference in the internal affairs of either the United States of Texas? 
If guilty, to what degree was she guilty? 
CHAPTER VII 
THE EXTENT AND NATDEE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S 
INTERVENTION: A CONCLUSION 
81 
The propriety of Great Britain's interference in the affairs of 
Texas and the United States in the annexation issue has been debated 
for over a century. To properly resolve the question of intervention, 
one must emphasize the fact that three parties were involved in the 
controversy. Too many authors, looking at the question with only Great 
Britain and the United States in mind, have excluded Texas, probably 
because they regarded Texas as already a part of the United States. 
Texas, however, was an independent nation. She conducted her own 
diplomacy and was formally recognized as a sovereign state. Therefore, 
she must be regarded as having the same international status as Great 
Britain and the United States. With this in mind, the question of 
interference by Great Britain must be answered affirmatively in regard 
to Texas, but negatively in regard to the United States. 
There has been a controversy among historians which centered on 
the question of whether slavery hastened or impeded annexation.^ 
Whether it did hasten or impede annexation is important, but the point 
to be made is that slavery was a focal point of the conflict between 
the countries involved. Another controversy that has arisen from this 
is the amount of blame that should be placed on the countries and indi­
viduals, particularly England and her statesmen, involved in the con­
flict over slavery. 
^Jesse Reeves, Chauncey Boucher, and George P. Garrison believed 
the slavery question blocked rather than hastened annexation, while 
Harriet Smither believed that English abolitionism was responsible for 
annexation being accomplished. 
8$ 
British diplomacy, in regard to Texas, was without doubt aimed 
at the abolition of slavery and designed to prevent the annexation of 
that nation to the United States» Ample proof of this was Aberdeen's 
diplomacy and the activities carried on by the British agents in Texas 
and Mexico» ¥e saw in the previous chapter that Elliot, British charge 
to Texas, openly admitted his desire to have slavery abolished in Texas 
and went so far as to advance a plan to achieve this goal to a member 
of the British Foreign Office. He, along with Doyle, British charge to 
Mexico, was also Instrumental In the negotiations of the Robinson Plan, 
which called for the abolition of slavery. Aberdeen, of course, openly 
committed Great Britain when he wrote to Doyle twice during the summer 
of I8U3 and stressed the desirability of Mexico making abolition a 
requisite for their acknowledgement of Texan Independence. As further 
proof of his Involvement, in l8hU, he wrote to Ashbel Smith that he 
regretted ever mentioning slavery in connection with Texas. These 
facts can leave little doubt that Great Britain and her statesmen tried 
by diplomatic means to abolish slavery in Texas. Even Ephraim Adams, 
who rose to the defense of Great Britain's diplomacy, wrote, "that this 
belief in British interest and proposed interference existed there can 
p 
be no doubt. « „ 
Even though the proof of British interference over slavery in 
Texas was readily admitted, some authors are reluctant to condemn Great 
Britain too harshly for her actions. There have been considerable dif­
ferences of opinion over Great Britain's role in the slavery issue. It 
is firmly believed by many that Texan statesmen used and encouraged 
^E. Adams, British Interests, p. 13« 
87 
British intervention to arouse annexation sentiment in the United States. 
If such were the case, Texas should then share in the blame of undue 
interference. 
The first real indication that the British desired to gain aboli­
tion in Texas came to light after Elliot reached Texas in August of 
l8i;2. It is believed that Elliot and Houston became closely associated, 
and that during this association, Houston admitted to Elliot that slavery 
was a deplorable institution»^ Shortly after, in November, Elliot wrote 
his first letter to Addington which suggested the plan of securing the 
abolition of slavery in Texas by compensating the slave holders with 
British money. Until this time no British official in authority had 
suggested that slavery be abolished, nor had there been any suggestions 
up to that time that Mexico make the abolition of slavery a condition 
of recognition. These circumstances have led some to believe that 
Houston inspired Elliot's plan on abolition. To Ephraim Adams, Elliot's 
plan, because it originated after Elliot came in contact with Houston, 
was , conclusive evidence of Houston's desire to make a tool of 
England."^ Adams was in accord with the theory held by another author, 
Jesse S, Reeves5 later, R. B. Mowat supported this same theory in his 
writings. 
Houston was also accused of using the Robinson Plan to arouse 
support for Texan annexation in the United States. The plan, we know, 
was negotiated by Elliot in Texas and Doyle in Mexico, but it must be 
B. Mowat, The Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and the 
United States (New York, 19251, 'p~l^OT" 
^E. Adams, British Interests, p. 113. 
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pointed out that the plan did not originate with them, but was advanced 
hy Mexico. Because Texas and Mexico did not have diplomatic relations, 
the British agents were asked by Houston to negotiate the plan for 
Texas. Elliot and Doyle were, of course, willing to do this as it 
seemed to further their goal of abolition. However, the fact remains, 
the plan was not a British plan; Texas simply asked Great Britain to 
conduct negotiations on the plan. In order to cause more alarm and 
jealousy in the United States, Houston made sure that the United States 
knew of this help given by the British. After the armistice was com­
pleted during the summer of 18^3, Houston informed Van Zandt in Wash­
ington to withdraw from any more attempts at annexation. While this 
showed that Houston was against annexation, it appeared even more evi­
dent when he later turned down Upshur's first attempt to reopen annex­
ation negotiations. 
What did Houston want—Independence or annexation? To all in­
tents and purposes, Houston desired an independent Texas and did every­
thing in his power to discourage annexation. This question has caused 
a separate controversy among historians, but appears to be related to 
the larger question of British guilt. If Houston was truly in favor 
of annexation, he and Texas used Great Britain to achieve national ends 
and should share a large part of that guilt» Many authors seem to be­
lieve that Houston was in favor of annexation» According to Reeves, 
for example, . . the policy determined upon, and carefully worked 
out, to force the United States to action through fears of British 
domination, was carried forward another step. Houston's declination 
of Upshur's overture was not counter to this policy but was strictly 
in accord with it."^ 
C&her authors, however* ere convinced by Houston's actions that 
he favored an independent Texas. William C. Binkley, accepting this 
view, wrote how Houston bragged to Murphy, United States chargé to 
Texas, how Texas would expand and become a great nation from California 
to the Columbia River.^ Houston, by his diplomatic actions, convinced 
many prominent statesmen that this was his belief* In addition to 
Elliot and Aberdeen, he convinced many Americans and Texans. After 
Houston rejected Upshur's proposal. Van Zandt, in a letter to Anson 
Jones, mentioned a memorial In favor of annexation, sent to Washington 
by the Texas Congress. This memorial, signed by all but four of the 
members of the Texan Congress, showed how much they desired annexation, 
7 
in spite of Houston's feelings on the matter. No matter what Houston's 
desires in the annexation issue were, it appeared he used Great Britain 
to achieve his goals. Houston's policy of using Great Britain to cause 
apprehension and jealousy In the United States was also carried out by 
the Texan ministers in Washington and London. Both Van Zandt and Smith 
seized every opportunity, as we saw in the previous chapter, to secure 
their goal of annexation to the United States. 
Aberdeen was firmly convinced by Houston and Andrews, the Texan 
abolitionist, that Texas would willingly go along with abolition of 
slavery. Therefore, he felt justified in asking Mexico to make abolition 
^J. Reeves, American Diplomacy, p. 13$« 
^William Blnkley, The Expansionist Movement in Texas I836-I8SO 
(Berkeley, California, 19^TT, P» 121. 
^Van Zandt to Jones, Februaiy 22, l8itU, Annual Report of the 
American Historical Association for the Tear 190B, II, 255» 
a condition for Texan recognition even though he probably knew that it 
was unwise diplomacy. Great Britain can, therefore, be charged with 
interference over slavery in Texas, but at the same time Houston must 
be charged with encouraging such diplomacy. 
The question of whether Great Britain was guilty of trying to 
gain the abolition of slavery in the United States by interference dur­
ing the controversy over the Texan annexation has given birth to oppos­
ing viewpoints. One view was that Great Britain did interfere while 
the other blamed the slavocracy of the South for the conflict that 
arose between Great Britain and the United States. 
Great Britain's connection with Texas was brought out early by 
Calhoun, when he tried to gain immediate recognition and annexation for 
Texas in 1836.^ As a result, Great Britain, who still hoped that Mexico 
would reconquer Texas, was accused of designs that her leading states­
men had not yet devised. We know that Calhoun's attempted annexation 
move failed decisively at that time, but it seemed to mark a trend of 
"supposed" British interference that would again arise in l8L3. 
Gilmer's Madlsonlan letter followed by Ashbel Smith's letter to 
Van Zandt early in I8I4.3 again aroused the fear of British designs on 
slavery in Texas. A great deal was made of the two letters, but here 
again it was concerned with British designs in Texas and not in the 
United States, even though the letters gave the impression that American 
slavery was in jeopardy. Gilmer's letter was described by Benton as a 
"clap of thunder in a clear sky," and he (Benton) defended Great Britain 
on the grounds that in his estimation no one in Washington was aware of 
^Supra, Chapter IV, p„ [|.8, 
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any such designs on her part. Being a Senator, Benton undoubtedly 
would have been aware of any proof which pointed to such designs or 
diplomacy on the part of Great Britain. Why, then, did Gilmer and 
later Smith imply such accusations? Many believed that Gilmer's letter 
was inspired by Calhoun with the sole purpose of reawakening the annex-
9 
ation issueI Smith had this same purpose in mind when he wrote. What 
better way was there to make the American public interested in any 
issue than to connect the name of Great Britain to it? Randolph Adams 
expressed this well when he wrote that, ". <, . it was not so much the 
fact of British interests and activities as it was the interpretation 
put upon them by Americans that makes all the difference because at 
this period in American history it was always possible to stir up fer­
vid patriotism by dragging in the bugaboo of Great Britain. 
Tyler wanted Great Britain's name to be Involved in the issue 
as he was sure that It would gain support for annexation. He still did 
not have the proof he wanted, however, to feel safe in directly accusing 
Great Britain of designs on American slavery. The summer of l8U3 served 
to give Tyler and the annexationists what th^ needed and considered as 
proof of British Interference. The British and Foreign Anti-Slavery 
Society held its convention at that time which subsequently led to 
Andrew's interview with Aberdeen. The fact that Aberdeen even granted 
Andrew an interview was a mistake on his part, but to make matters 
worse, he appeared to be in sympatic with a plan to compensate Texan 
^Eugene McCormac, James K. Polk, A Political Biography (Berkeley, 
California, 1922), p. 219. 
^^Randolph Adams, A History of the Foreign Policy of the United 
States (New York, 192^), p. l6b. 
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slave holders. Smith, the Te^an chargé, we learned, then questioned 
Aberdeen on the interview and Aberdeen made his statement that, "It is 
the well known policy and wish of the British government to abolish 
slavery everywhere." This proved to be another mistake on Aberdeen's 
part, as this statement was made the most of by Duff Green; even though 
Aberdeen stated that Great Britain would not interfere improperly on 
the subject, the damage had been done. George Rives believed that Green 
did not accurately report on Smith's interview with Aberdeen and that 
the statements he produced had a great effect on the actions of the 
United States governmentGreen also reported that he talked to one 
of the leaders of the British opposition party headed by Palmerston 
and Lord John Russell<. He said Russell had told him that his party 
would assail the ministry on their American policy. Furthermore, if 
Palmerston returned to power his party would be in favor of non-inter-
ference in the domestic policy of other nations and that they would 
denounce the attempt to emancipate the slaves of the United States and 
12 
Texas as unwise Interference. With such reports as these, it waa 
little wonder that V&shington figured the British had definite plans 
for abolition in Texas and elsewhere. 
Upshur seemingly believed these reports, but he asked Edward 
Eb^rett, the United States minister to Great Britain, to investigate 
their validity. After asking Aberdeen to elucidate his policy on this 
matter, Everett Informed Upshur that Aberdeen had said that Great Bri­
tain would not interfere; that she had done this primarily to satisfy 
^^G.Rives, The United States and Mexico, p. $69. 
1 P 
J. Reeves, American Diplomacy, p. 125^ 
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the abolitionists^ but that she would not go on a crusade with them. 
At about the same time, Aberdeen also denied any Improper interference. 
Ephraim Adams says that even though Aberdeen disclaimed any interfer­
ence to Everett and Smith, both explanations were stamped with the hope 
of abolition in Texas. Because of this, it left little doubt that he 
and the British people were in favor of it. Therefore, according to 
11 
Adams, it gave the basis of truth for American suspicions. Everett, 
however, believed Aberdeen's explanation and let Upshur know that he 
was more inclined to believe in Aberdeen than he was in Daff Green. 
Because he could gain nothing to arouse fears of British suprem­
acy in Texas from Everett's report, Upshur preferred to believe Duff 
Green's reports. George Rives and Jesse Reeves both seemed to believe 
that Upshur had more in mind than just the abolition of slavery in 
Texas. His worst fear was that Great Britain aimed at the abolition 
of slavery in all of America. Tyler and Calhoun also preferred to be­
lieve Green's word over that of the official minister to Great Britain. 
It appeared that they were only Interested in hearing what they wanted 
to believe in order to gain added support for annexation. 
Further proof was added, as far as the annexationists were con-
cerned, in August, when Lord Brougham advanced his idea to Parliament 
to get slavery abolished in Texas which would, in turn, react against 
slavery in the United States. Aberdeen, it must be recalled, refused 
to present the papers and gave only an evasive answer. This led many 
to believe that Great Britain was planning some action in the matter. 
This evasive answer was poor judgment on Aberdeen's part, but again 
Adams, British Interests, pp. Ib5^lb6. 
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there was only an assumption, bub no proof, that Great Britain had de-
signs on slavery in the United States, 
Alarmed hy the furor in the United States, Aberdeen wrote his 
letter of December 26, which caused the famed Pakenham-Calhoun corres­
pondence. We saw that in spite of a sincere attempt by Aberdeen to 
disclaim all interference on slavery in the United States, Calhoun used 
it to place the right of the United States to annexation entirely on 
the defense of slavery. Pakenham denied Calhoun's accusations, claimed 
that Aberdeen's letter had been misused, and again reiterated that Great 
Britain had no designs in the United States, Calhoun persisted, how­
ever, and again implied that Great Britain was interfering Internally 
in the United States. Most authors put the blame directly on Calhoun, 
contending that the letter was intended not for Pakenham, but the 
American people. "Never were the tools of diplomacy^" wrote Reeves, 
lii 
"put to political use with more disastrous results than by Calhoun." 
The result was that the annexation treaty was defeated and again slavery 
was not the aid to annexation, but the obstacle. Benton now accused 
Calhoun of making the annexation issue a political issue in the campaign 
of l81ili» His purpose, Benton said, was to prevent the nomination of 
I'o 
Tan Buren and the election of Henry Clay. If this were true, Calhoun 
succeeded in carrying out his purpose, and the supposed Interference by 
Great Britain in the question of slavery over Texan annexation served 
him well. 
In fairness to Calhoun, it must be mentioned that Aberdeen was 
Reeves, American Diplomacy, p. 150. 
1 < 
T. Benton, Thirty Tears View, II, $90. 
not without fault in the matter. He denied that Great Britain was 
interfering Improperly in the abolition of slavery in Texas while he 
had already taken steps to do just that. His instructions to Doyle, 
chargé in Mexico, had long been written in which he stressed the im­
portance of Mexico recognizing Texas in return for abolition. But here 
again. It was for abolition in Texas and not in the United States. 
Because of this conflict over slavery, Aberdeen then decided 
that it would be best to change tactics, and as we have seen, regretted 
that he had ever mentioned slavery. The controversy over slavery was 
thus terminated as far as Great Britain was concerned, and Aberdeen 
would not mention it again. 
Did Great Britain then interfere improperly by diplomatic means 
with slavery in the United States during the controversy over the Texan 
annexation? There is little proof to substantiate such an interpreta-
tion. On the other hand, the theory that Great Britain, her statesmen, 
and a vast majority of the British people "wished" or "desired" to see 
abolition in the United States can be agreed with. There is a differ-
ence between the two positions, although many have tended to confuse 
them. We have seen that Great Britain did interfere in Texas, but again 
it must be remembered that Texas was not yet a part of the United States 
therefore, this interference was not directed against the United States 
and any such claims can be based on only assumptions. 
Justin Smith was very emphatic about British guilt in Texas and 
felt that it was aimed at the United States. "We have seen," he writes, 
. . that she endeavored to effect the destruction of slavery in 
Texas, trying to gain the point first as the price of recognition,. . . 
and we have seen that she chiefly desired abolition in Texas with a 
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view to this country." He added that, . . the facts are incontest­
able that her designs in regard to Texas were deep and perseveringg 
that they were believed in by herself, by the Texan representatives at 
her court, and by her own representatives in Texas to be very unfavor-
16 
able to American interests." He does admit that Great Britain had 
the right to "wish" this, however. 
IMost of the responsibility for the conflict must be borne by 
Aberdeen, according to maqy authors. Aberdeen is accused by George 
Rives of being unsteady and inconsistent in his conduct of American 
affairs. He tried hard to shape the future of Texas and keep Mexico 
at peace, but he abandoned one position after another. He is also 
accused by Rives as lacking in the ability or strength of character to 
carry through any policy which seemed to be opposed by the people of 
17 
the United States. We have seen that Aberdeen made several state­
ments that a person in a high position should have refrained from 
making. That he lacked diplomatic ability, however, we will leave to 
conjecture. Aberdeen was defended by Ephraim Adams and Jesse Reeves 
because they felt that Aberdeen was accused on insufficient grounds. 
.Adams excused Aberdeen on the grounds that criticism of his actions, 
. . was centered upon his lack of frankness and his unaccustomed use 
18 
of devious ways." Whatever the faults of Aberdeen as a diplomat, he 
should not be accused of meddling in the American slavery question be-
cause of his own personal wishes or desires. The same can be said for 
Smith, The Annexation of Texas, p. 97° 
Rives, The United States and Mexico, p. 538. 
Adams, British Interests, p. 232. 
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British abolitionists such as Lord Brougham when he expressed his per-
sonal desire for seeing abolition take place in the United States. 
Great Britain should not be condemned or held responsible for 
the personal ideals of individual citizens or the humanitarian interests 
of groups such as the abolitionist societies. These ideals and inter­
ests cannot, on the other hand, be overlooked in the study of a nation's 
diplomacy and the course that it may take. Great Britain, after the 
turn of the century, was in a state of reform of which the anti-slavery 
movement was only a part. The lower classes of England, due to the 
Industrial revolution and the consequent move from a rural to an urban 
society, were demanding more representation in government that would 
favor the common man. Riots were staged in many parts of the nation 
which, to the leaders of the nation, conjured up the vision of the 
bloody French Révolution. As a result, the ear of the English govern­
ment was attuned to the desires and wishes of its citizens. The Anti-
Slavery Society of 1823 was a part of this reform movement and was 
formed for the purpose of gradually abolishing slavery in the British 
colonies. The leadership of this humanitarian society, as mentioned 
earlier, was composed of evangelical churchmen. That many of these 
leaders were influential in the English government there can be little 
doubt when one learns that the Anti-Slavery Society of 1823 had a Royal 
Dake as its president with five peers and fourteen members of Parliament 
19 
as vice-presidents. After the abolition of slavery in 1833 the ideals 
of the anti-slavery societies would then be taken on by the English 
government. Consequently, it was an ideological wish on the part of 
Lo Mathieson, British Slavery, p. Il8. 
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Great Britain and her citizens to see slavery abolished everywhere. 
Such wishes, however, cannot be construed as undue interference by one 
country on another. If such were the case, the United States today 
could be accused of ideological diplomacy against Russia, since the 
vast majority of people in this country certainly wish to see that 
Coinraunist regime changed. 
It is interesting to note that several authors have taken a stand 
in the defense of the South on the annexation issue. While they do not 
blame Great Britain for any great degree of intervention on slavery, 
they contend that it was not a slave holders' conspiracy to advance 
the extension of slavery. Joseph Schmltz writes that this idea has 
been generally superseded and that the belief now is that the movement 
was broader. He says that it grew out of a desire for an empire and 
that manifest destiny is now believed to have challenged the designs 
of Great Britain. This interpretation, be believes, is now generally 
20 
accepted. Other authors such as John Latane, David Wainhouse, and 
Samuel Beniis seem to support this view. Whether historians blamed 
Southern slavocracy or the advocates of manifest destiny for the desire 
to acquire Texas is a separate and distinct controversy. Whether the 
British can be blamed for interference in the domestic question of 
slavery is something else. That they cannot be blamed appears to be 
the only answer to this question. 
When it is remembered that the controversy was a three-way con-
flict with Texas Included, and that mere Ideals and desires on the part 
ZOjoseph Schmltz, Texan Statecraft 1836°18U^ (San Antonio, 19Ll), 
p. 206. 
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Individuals and groups are not construed as diplomatic acts, it can be 
said that Great Britain Intervened in Texas with the abolition of slav­
ery. For these same reasons, it can be said that Great Britain did not 
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